Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

Recruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that villa...

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Main Authors:	Zhang, Jian, Giles, John, Rozelle, Scott
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ATTRITION BORROWING CITIES COMMUNITIES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE COUNTRYSIDE DEBT DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEPOSITS DESCRIPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP DIRECT PAYMENTS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FAMILY LABOR FARM EMPLOYMENT FARM INCOME FARM OUTPUT FARM PRICES FARM WORK FARMERS FARMLAND FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL RETURN GROWTH RATE HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME GAP INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOMES INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTANGIBLES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LAND RIGHTS LEASING LOCAL BANKS MACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MOBILITY OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POOR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRIVATIZATION REGRESSORS REMOTE VILLAGES RENTS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMER RURAL ECONOMY RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SECRETARIES SERVANTS SHARE PRICES SOCIAL PROTECTION STANDARD ERROR STANDARD ERRORS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUPPLIERS TAX TOWNS TREASURY URBAN AREAS URBANIZATION VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES WAGES YOUTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340

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spelling	okr-10986-93402021-04-23T14:02:45Z Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China Zhang, Jian Giles, John Rozelle, Scott ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ATTRITION BORROWING CITIES COMMUNITIES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE COUNTRYSIDE DEBT DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEPOSITS DESCRIPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP DIRECT PAYMENTS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FAMILY LABOR FARM EMPLOYMENT FARM INCOME FARM OUTPUT FARM PRICES FARM WORK FARMERS FARMLAND FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL RETURN GROWTH RATE HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME GAP INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOMES INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTANGIBLES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LAND RIGHTS LEASING LOCAL BANKS MACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MOBILITY OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POOR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRIVATIZATION REGRESSORS REMOTE VILLAGES RENTS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMER RURAL ECONOMY RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SECRETARIES SERVANTS SHARE PRICES SOCIAL PROTECTION STANDARD ERROR STANDARD ERRORS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUPPLIERS TAX TOWNS TREASURY URBAN AREAS URBANIZATION VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES WAGES YOUTH Recruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that village cadres, who are the lowest level of administrators in rural areas, exploit personal political status for economic gain. Much existing research, however, compares the earnings of cadre and non-cadre households in rural China without controlling for unobserved dimensions of ability that are also correlated with success as entrepreneurs or in non-agricultural activities. The findings of this paper suggest a measurable return to cadre status, but the magnitudes are not large and provide only a modest incentive to participate in village-level government. The paper does not find evidence that households of village cadres earn significant rents from having a family member who is a cadre. Given the increasing returns to non-agricultural employment since China's economic reforms began, it is not surprising that the returns to working as a village cadre have also increased over time. Returns to cadre-status are derived both from direct compensation and subsidies for cadres and indirectly through returns earned in off-farm employment from businesses and economic activities managed by villages. 2012-06-29T21:01:00Z 2012-06-29T21:01:00Z 2012-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6081 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific China
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ATTRITION BORROWING CITIES COMMUNITIES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE COUNTRYSIDE DEBT DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEPOSITS DESCRIPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP DIRECT PAYMENTS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FAMILY LABOR FARM EMPLOYMENT FARM INCOME FARM OUTPUT FARM PRICES FARM WORK FARMERS FARMLAND FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL RETURN GROWTH RATE HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME GAP INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOMES INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTANGIBLES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LAND RIGHTS LEASING LOCAL BANKS MACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MOBILITY OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POOR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRIVATIZATION REGRESSORS REMOTE VILLAGES RENTS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMER RURAL ECONOMY RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SECRETARIES SERVANTS SHARE PRICES SOCIAL PROTECTION STANDARD ERROR STANDARD ERRORS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUPPLIERS TAX TOWNS TREASURY URBAN AREAS URBANIZATION VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES WAGES YOUTH
spellingShingle	ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ATTRITION BORROWING CITIES COMMUNITIES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE COUNTRYSIDE DEBT DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEPOSITS DESCRIPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP DIRECT PAYMENTS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FAMILY LABOR FARM EMPLOYMENT FARM INCOME FARM OUTPUT FARM PRICES FARM WORK FARMERS FARMLAND FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL RETURN GROWTH RATE HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME GAP INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOMES INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTANGIBLES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LAND RIGHTS LEASING LOCAL BANKS MACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MOBILITY OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POOR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRIVATIZATION REGRESSORS REMOTE VILLAGES RENTS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMER RURAL ECONOMY RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SECRETARIES SERVANTS SHARE PRICES SOCIAL PROTECTION STANDARD ERROR STANDARD ERRORS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUPPLIERS TAX TOWNS TREASURY URBAN AREAS URBANIZATION VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES WAGES YOUTH Zhang, Jian Giles, John Rozelle, Scott Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
geographic_facet	East Asia and Pacific China
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6081
description	Recruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that village cadres, who are the lowest level of administrators in rural areas, exploit personal political status for economic gain. Much existing research, however, compares the earnings of cadre and non-cadre households in rural China without controlling for unobserved dimensions of ability that are also correlated with success as entrepreneurs or in non-agricultural activities. The findings of this paper suggest a measurable return to cadre status, but the magnitudes are not large and provide only a modest incentive to participate in village-level government. The paper does not find evidence that households of village cadres earn significant rents from having a family member who is a cadre. Given the increasing returns to non-agricultural employment since China's economic reforms began, it is not surprising that the returns to working as a village cadre have also increased over time. Returns to cadre-status are derived both from direct compensation and subsidies for cadres and indirectly through returns earned in off-farm employment from businesses and economic activities managed by villages.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Zhang, Jian Giles, John Rozelle, Scott
author_facet	Zhang, Jian Giles, John Rozelle, Scott
author_sort	Zhang, Jian
title	Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
title_short	Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
title_full	Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
title_fullStr	Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
title_full_unstemmed	Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China
title_sort	does it pay to be a cadre? estimating the returns to being a local official in rural china
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340
_version_	1764409198309801984

Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

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