Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

Recruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that villa...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Zhang, Jian, Giles, John, Rozelle, Scott
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ATTRITION BORROWING CITIES COMMUNITIES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE COUNTRYSIDE DEBT DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC DEPOSITS DESCRIPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP DIRECT PAYMENTS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC REFORMS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FAMILY LABOR FARM EMPLOYMENT FARM INCOME FARM OUTPUT FARM PRICES FARM WORK FARMERS FARMLAND FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL RETURN GROWTH RATE HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INCOME GAP INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOMES INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTANGIBLES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LAND RIGHTS LEASING LOCAL BANKS MACRO ECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MOBILITY OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POOR PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PRIVATIZATION REGRESSORS REMOTE VILLAGES RENTS RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CONSUMER RURAL ECONOMY RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SECRETARIES SERVANTS SHARE PRICES SOCIAL PROTECTION STANDARD ERROR STANDARD ERRORS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUPPLIERS TAX TOWNS TREASURY URBAN AREAS URBANIZATION VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES WAGES YOUTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16357383/pay-cadre-estimating-returns-being-local-official-rural-china
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9340

Does It Pay to Be a Cadre? Estimating the Returns to Being a Local Official in Rural China

Internet

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