Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transactio...

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Main Authors: Giné, Xavier, Karlan, Dean S.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/09/7063025/group-versus-individual-liability-field-experiment-philippines
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9268
id okr-10986-9268
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-92682021-04-23T14:02:41Z Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines Giné, Xavier Karlan, Dean S. BANKS CHECKS CLAUSE DEPOSITS FINANCIAL MARKETS INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INSTALLMENT INSTALLMENTS LIABILITY LIABILITY CLAIMS LIABILITY RULE MICROFINANCE MORAL HAZARD MUTUAL AGREEMENT NETWORKS NEW ENTRANTS PENALTIES PERSONAL SAVINGS PROFITABILITY PROTOCOLS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS ACCOUNTS SAVINGS BEHAVIOR TRANSACTION COSTS Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor, and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender s overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. The authors worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. They randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability 'centers' of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients. 2012-06-26T18:01:23Z 2012-06-26T18:01:23Z 2006-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/09/7063025/group-versus-individual-liability-field-experiment-philippines http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9268 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4008 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Philippines
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic BANKS
CHECKS
CLAUSE
DEPOSITS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
INSTALLMENT
INSTALLMENTS
LIABILITY
LIABILITY CLAIMS
LIABILITY RULE
MICROFINANCE
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL AGREEMENT
NETWORKS
NEW ENTRANTS
PENALTIES
PERSONAL SAVINGS
PROFITABILITY
PROTOCOLS
SAFETY NETS
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
TRANSACTION COSTS
spellingShingle BANKS
CHECKS
CLAUSE
DEPOSITS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
INSTALLMENT
INSTALLMENTS
LIABILITY
LIABILITY CLAIMS
LIABILITY RULE
MICROFINANCE
MORAL HAZARD
MUTUAL AGREEMENT
NETWORKS
NEW ENTRANTS
PENALTIES
PERSONAL SAVINGS
PROFITABILITY
PROTOCOLS
SAFETY NETS
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
TRANSACTION COSTS
Giné, Xavier
Karlan, Dean S.
Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
geographic_facet East Asia and Pacific
Southeast Asia
Asia
Philippines
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4008
description Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor, and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender s overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. The authors worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. They randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability 'centers' of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Giné, Xavier
Karlan, Dean S.
author_facet Giné, Xavier
Karlan, Dean S.
author_sort Giné, Xavier
title Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
title_short Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
title_full Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
title_fullStr Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
title_full_unstemmed Group versus Individual Liability : A Field Experiment in the Philippines
title_sort group versus individual liability : a field experiment in the philippines
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/09/7063025/group-versus-individual-liability-field-experiment-philippines
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9268
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