Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?

An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction...

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Main Authors:	Gurgur, Tugrul, Shah, Anwar
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS BANKS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY GROUPS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CRIME CRIMINAL LAW DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXPENDITURES EXTORTION FEDERAL STATES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT MANDATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES HIGH CORRUPTION INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE LAWS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS MEDIA MOTIVATIONS NATIONS NEPOTISM PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC TRUST PUNISHMENT RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW RULES OF CONDUCT SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL GROUPS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX SYSTEMS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899

id	okr-10986-8899
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-88992021-04-23T14:02:42Z Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box? Gurgur, Tugrul Shah, Anwar ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS BANKS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY GROUPS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CRIME CRIMINAL LAW DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXPENDITURES EXTORTION FEDERAL STATES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT MANDATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES HIGH CORRUPTION INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE LAWS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS MEDIA MOTIVATIONS NATIONS NEPOTISM PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC TRUST PUNISHMENT RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW RULES OF CONDUCT SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL GROUPS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX SYSTEMS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries. 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z 2005-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3486 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS BANKS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY GROUPS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CRIME CRIMINAL LAW DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXPENDITURES EXTORTION FEDERAL STATES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT MANDATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES HIGH CORRUPTION INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE LAWS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS MEDIA MOTIVATIONS NATIONS NEPOTISM PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC TRUST PUNISHMENT RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW RULES OF CONDUCT SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL GROUPS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX SYSTEMS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS BANKS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY GROUPS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CRIME CRIMINAL LAW DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXPENDITURES EXTORTION FEDERAL STATES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT MANDATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES HIGH CORRUPTION INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE LAWS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS MEDIA MOTIVATIONS NATIONS NEPOTISM PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC TRUST PUNISHMENT RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW RULES OF CONDUCT SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL GROUPS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX SYSTEMS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER Gurgur, Tugrul Shah, Anwar Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3486
description	An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Gurgur, Tugrul Shah, Anwar
author_facet	Gurgur, Tugrul Shah, Anwar
author_sort	Gurgur, Tugrul
title	Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_short	Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_full	Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_fullStr	Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_full_unstemmed	Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_sort	localization and corruption : panacea or pandora’s box?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899
_version_	1764406957054099456

Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?

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