Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?

An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction...

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Main Authors: Gurgur, Tugrul, Shah, Anwar
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
CPI
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899
id okr-10986-8899
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-88992021-04-23T14:02:42Z Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box? Gurgur, Tugrul Shah, Anwar ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS BANKS BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY GROUPS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CRIME CRIMINAL LAW DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS ELECTED OFFICIALS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXPENDITURES EXTORTION FEDERAL STATES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT MANDATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES HIGH CORRUPTION INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE LAWS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS MEDIA MOTIVATIONS NATIONS NEPOTISM PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC TRUST PUNISHMENT RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW RULES OF CONDUCT SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL GROUPS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX SYSTEMS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries. 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z 2012-06-22T22:10:38Z 2005-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3486 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
BANKS
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
CITIZENS
CIVIL LIBERTIES
CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
CIVIL SOCIETY
COLLUSION
COMMUNITIES
COMMUNITY GROUPS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CPI
CRIME
CRIMINAL LAW
DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
ELECTED OFFICIALS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EMPLOYMENT
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY
EXPENDITURES
EXTORTION
FEDERAL STATES
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT MANDATES
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
GOVERNMENT SIZE
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
HIGH CORRUPTION
INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
JURISDICTIONS
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL ELECTIONS
LOCAL OFFICIALS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MEDIA
MOTIVATIONS
NATIONS
NEPOTISM
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PARTY DISCIPLINE
PENALTIES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL CONTROL
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL RIGHTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
PUBLIC TRUST
PUNISHMENT
RENT SEEKING
RULE OF LAW
RULES OF CONDUCT
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL GROUPS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
TAX SYSTEMS
TRANSPARENCY
TRANSPORTATION
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
BANKS
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
CITIZENS
CIVIL LIBERTIES
CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
CIVIL SOCIETY
COLLUSION
COMMUNITIES
COMMUNITY GROUPS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CPI
CRIME
CRIMINAL LAW
DECENTRALIZATION INITIATIVES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
ELECTED OFFICIALS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EMPLOYMENT
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY
EXPENDITURES
EXTORTION
FEDERAL STATES
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT MANDATES
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
GOVERNMENT SIZE
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
HIGH CORRUPTION
INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
JURISDICTIONS
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL ELECTIONS
LOCAL OFFICIALS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MEDIA
MOTIVATIONS
NATIONS
NEPOTISM
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PARTY DISCIPLINE
PENALTIES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL CONTROL
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL RIGHTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
PUBLIC TRUST
PUNISHMENT
RENT SEEKING
RULE OF LAW
RULES OF CONDUCT
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL GROUPS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
TAX SYSTEMS
TRANSPARENCY
TRANSPORTATION
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
Gurgur, Tugrul
Shah, Anwar
Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3486
description An extensive literature on the relationship between decentralization (or localization) and corruption has developed in recent years. While some authors argue that there is a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption, others claim that decentralization in fact leads to a reduction in the level of corruption. This important policy question has not yet been laid to rest, since previous empirical work simply uses eclectic regressions and lacks a conceptual framework to discover the root causes of corruption. This paper attempts to fill this void by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. The following results emerge: 1) For a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. 2) Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Gurgur, Tugrul
Shah, Anwar
author_facet Gurgur, Tugrul
Shah, Anwar
author_sort Gurgur, Tugrul
title Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_short Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_full Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_fullStr Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_full_unstemmed Localization and Corruption : Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
title_sort localization and corruption : panacea or pandora’s box?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5592592/localization-corruption-panacea-or-pandoras-box
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8899
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