Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. T...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850 |
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okr-10986-88502021-04-23T14:02:41Z Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources Zara, Stefano Dinar, Ariel Patrone, Fioravante ACID RAIN APPROPRIATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BIOLOGICAL MODELS BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY BIOMASS COASTAL AREA COASTAL STATE CONSUMER PREFERENCES CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM COST FUNCTIONS CPR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC VALUE ECONOMICS ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS ECOSYSTEM EMISSIONS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM EXCLUDABILITY EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FISH FISH PRODUCTS FISH RESOURCES FISH STOCKS FISHERIES FISHERIES ISSUES FISHERIES MANAGEMENT FISHERIES SECTOR FISHERY FISHERY MANAGEMENT FISHERY RESOURCES FISHERY STATISTICS FISHES FISHING FISHING EFFORT FISHING GEAR FISHING UNITS FOREST FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTS FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GAME THEORY HIGH SEAS HIGH SEAS FISHERIES MARKET MECHANISM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES NATURE OPEN ACCESS POLLUTANTS POLLUTION POPULATION DYNAMICS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS RENEWABLE RESOURCE SEA SEAS SIDE PAYMENTS SOLE SPECIES STOCK LEVEL SUBTRACTABILITY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS TRANSFER PAYMENTS TUNA WATER RESOURCE WATER RESOURCES WHALES WHALING This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments. 2012-06-22T20:03:34Z 2012-06-22T20:03:34Z 2006-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4073 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACID RAIN APPROPRIATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BIOLOGICAL MODELS BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY BIOMASS COASTAL AREA COASTAL STATE CONSUMER PREFERENCES CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM COST FUNCTIONS CPR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC VALUE ECONOMICS ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS ECOSYSTEM EMISSIONS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM EXCLUDABILITY EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FISH FISH PRODUCTS FISH RESOURCES FISH STOCKS FISHERIES FISHERIES ISSUES FISHERIES MANAGEMENT FISHERIES SECTOR FISHERY FISHERY MANAGEMENT FISHERY RESOURCES FISHERY STATISTICS FISHES FISHING FISHING EFFORT FISHING GEAR FISHING UNITS FOREST FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTS FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GAME THEORY HIGH SEAS HIGH SEAS FISHERIES MARKET MECHANISM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES NATURE OPEN ACCESS POLLUTANTS POLLUTION POPULATION DYNAMICS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS RENEWABLE RESOURCE SEA SEAS SIDE PAYMENTS SOLE SPECIES STOCK LEVEL SUBTRACTABILITY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS TRANSFER PAYMENTS TUNA WATER RESOURCE WATER RESOURCES WHALES WHALING |
spellingShingle |
ACID RAIN APPROPRIATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BIOLOGICAL MODELS BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY BIOMASS COASTAL AREA COASTAL STATE CONSUMER PREFERENCES CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM COST FUNCTIONS CPR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC VALUE ECONOMICS ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS ECOSYSTEM EMISSIONS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM EXCLUDABILITY EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FISH FISH PRODUCTS FISH RESOURCES FISH STOCKS FISHERIES FISHERIES ISSUES FISHERIES MANAGEMENT FISHERIES SECTOR FISHERY FISHERY MANAGEMENT FISHERY RESOURCES FISHERY STATISTICS FISHES FISHING FISHING EFFORT FISHING GEAR FISHING UNITS FOREST FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTS FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GAME THEORY HIGH SEAS HIGH SEAS FISHERIES MARKET MECHANISM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES NATURE OPEN ACCESS POLLUTANTS POLLUTION POPULATION DYNAMICS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS RENEWABLE RESOURCE SEA SEAS SIDE PAYMENTS SOLE SPECIES STOCK LEVEL SUBTRACTABILITY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS TRANSFER PAYMENTS TUNA WATER RESOURCE WATER RESOURCES WHALES WHALING Zara, Stefano Dinar, Ariel Patrone, Fioravante Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4073 |
description |
This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Zara, Stefano Dinar, Ariel Patrone, Fioravante |
author_facet |
Zara, Stefano Dinar, Ariel Patrone, Fioravante |
author_sort |
Zara, Stefano |
title |
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
title_short |
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
title_full |
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
title_fullStr |
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources |
title_sort |
cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850 |
_version_ |
1764406646625271808 |