Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. T...

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Main Authors: Zara, Stefano, Dinar, Ariel, Patrone, Fioravante
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850
id okr-10986-8850
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-88502021-04-23T14:02:41Z Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources Zara, Stefano Dinar, Ariel Patrone, Fioravante ACID RAIN APPROPRIATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BIOLOGICAL MODELS BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY BIOMASS COASTAL AREA COASTAL STATE CONSUMER PREFERENCES CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM COST FUNCTIONS CPR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC VALUE ECONOMICS ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS ECOSYSTEM EMISSIONS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM EXCLUDABILITY EXPLOITATION EXTERNALITIES FISH FISH PRODUCTS FISH RESOURCES FISH STOCKS FISHERIES FISHERIES ISSUES FISHERIES MANAGEMENT FISHERIES SECTOR FISHERY FISHERY MANAGEMENT FISHERY RESOURCES FISHERY STATISTICS FISHES FISHING FISHING EFFORT FISHING GEAR FISHING UNITS FOREST FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTS FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GAME THEORY HIGH SEAS HIGH SEAS FISHERIES MARKET MECHANISM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES NATURE OPEN ACCESS POLLUTANTS POLLUTION POPULATION DYNAMICS PRESENT VALUE PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS RENEWABLE RESOURCE SEA SEAS SIDE PAYMENTS SOLE SPECIES STOCK LEVEL SUBTRACTABILITY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS TRANSFER PAYMENTS TUNA WATER RESOURCE WATER RESOURCES WHALES WHALING This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments. 2012-06-22T20:03:34Z 2012-06-22T20:03:34Z 2006-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4073 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACID RAIN
APPROPRIATION
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BIOLOGICAL MODELS
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY
BIOMASS
COASTAL AREA
COASTAL STATE
CONSUMER PREFERENCES
CONSUMERS
COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
COST FUNCTIONS
CPR
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DISCOUNT RATE
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIC VALUE
ECONOMICS
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
ECONOMISTS
ECOSYSTEM
EMISSIONS
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
EQUILIBRIA
EQUILIBRIUM
EXCLUDABILITY
EXPLOITATION
EXTERNALITIES
FISH
FISH PRODUCTS
FISH RESOURCES
FISH STOCKS
FISHERIES
FISHERIES ISSUES
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
FISHERIES SECTOR
FISHERY
FISHERY MANAGEMENT
FISHERY RESOURCES
FISHERY STATISTICS
FISHES
FISHING
FISHING EFFORT
FISHING GEAR
FISHING UNITS
FOREST
FOREST MANAGEMENT
FORESTS
FREE RIDER
FREE RIDER PROBLEM
GAME THEORY
HIGH SEAS
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
MARKET MECHANISM
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATURAL RESOURCES
NATURE
OPEN ACCESS
POLLUTANTS
POLLUTION
POPULATION DYNAMICS
PRESENT VALUE
PRIVATE GOODS
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOODS
QUOTAS
RENEWABLE RESOURCE
SEA
SEAS
SIDE PAYMENTS
SOLE
SPECIES
STOCK LEVEL
SUBTRACTABILITY
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
TRANSFER PAYMENTS
TUNA
WATER RESOURCE
WATER RESOURCES
WHALES
WHALING
spellingShingle ACID RAIN
APPROPRIATION
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BIOLOGICAL MODELS
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY
BIOMASS
COASTAL AREA
COASTAL STATE
CONSUMER PREFERENCES
CONSUMERS
COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
COST FUNCTIONS
CPR
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DISCOUNT RATE
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIC VALUE
ECONOMICS
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
ECONOMISTS
ECOSYSTEM
EMISSIONS
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
EQUILIBRIA
EQUILIBRIUM
EXCLUDABILITY
EXPLOITATION
EXTERNALITIES
FISH
FISH PRODUCTS
FISH RESOURCES
FISH STOCKS
FISHERIES
FISHERIES ISSUES
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
FISHERIES SECTOR
FISHERY
FISHERY MANAGEMENT
FISHERY RESOURCES
FISHERY STATISTICS
FISHES
FISHING
FISHING EFFORT
FISHING GEAR
FISHING UNITS
FOREST
FOREST MANAGEMENT
FORESTS
FREE RIDER
FREE RIDER PROBLEM
GAME THEORY
HIGH SEAS
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
MARKET MECHANISM
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATURAL RESOURCES
NATURE
OPEN ACCESS
POLLUTANTS
POLLUTION
POPULATION DYNAMICS
PRESENT VALUE
PRIVATE GOODS
PRODUCTIVITY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOODS
QUOTAS
RENEWABLE RESOURCE
SEA
SEAS
SIDE PAYMENTS
SOLE
SPECIES
STOCK LEVEL
SUBTRACTABILITY
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
TRANSFER PAYMENTS
TUNA
WATER RESOURCE
WATER RESOURCES
WHALES
WHALING
Zara, Stefano
Dinar, Ariel
Patrone, Fioravante
Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4073
description This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Zara, Stefano
Dinar, Ariel
Patrone, Fioravante
author_facet Zara, Stefano
Dinar, Ariel
Patrone, Fioravante
author_sort Zara, Stefano
title Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
title_short Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
title_full Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
title_fullStr Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
title_full_unstemmed Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources
title_sort cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850
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