Leadership and the Independent Regulator
Being a utility regulator has perils because the independence of the regulator necessarily removes power from politicians, operators, and others. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved in shaping the policies that they are supposed to...
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| Format: | Publications & Research |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6030514/leadership-independent-regulator http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8217 |
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okr-10986-82172021-04-23T14:02:43Z Leadership and the Independent Regulator Jamison, Mark A. ACCOUNTABILITY ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS ATTENTION AUTHORITY BELIEFS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS COST ANALYSIS DISCUSSION GROUPS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORIES ECONOMISTS ENTERTAINMENT LAW FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FISCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INTELLIGENCE LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP LEARNING LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY MEDIA MINISTERS MODELING MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OIL ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PROGRAMS PUBLIC POLICY QUALITY STANDARDS RADIO REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY COMMISSIONS REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PROCESS REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH CENTERS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TELEPHONE COMPANIES TELEPHONE SERVICE THINKING TRANSPARENCY UTILITY REGULATION Being a utility regulator has perils because the independence of the regulator necessarily removes power from politicians, operators, and others. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved in shaping the policies that they are supposed to implement. As a result of such frictions, regulators are sometimes removed from office or marginalized in some way. How can regulators not only survive in such an environment, but also thrive? Jamison describes a leadership concept called adaptive leadership that regulators can use to help their countries adapt to new policies and changing situations, while allowing the regulator to stay in the game. The first leadership skill he discusses is the ability to get on the balcony to see what is really going on with operators, politicians, consumers, and others. Once this perspective is obtained, then the regulator can engage stakeholders in an adaptive process in which people make necessary changes to traditions and expectations, while hanging on to the things that are truly important. Regulators can do this by bringing attention to problems that people want to ignore because they involve difficult tradeoffs, providing certainty and stability when tensions become too high for work to be done, and keeping attention focused on the work and the issues. 2012-06-15T21:08:41Z 2012-06-15T21:08:41Z 2005-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6030514/leadership-independent-regulator http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8217 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3620 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS ATTENTION AUTHORITY BELIEFS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS COST ANALYSIS DISCUSSION GROUPS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORIES ECONOMISTS ENTERTAINMENT LAW FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FISCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INTELLIGENCE LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP LEARNING LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY MEDIA MINISTERS MODELING MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OIL ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PROGRAMS PUBLIC POLICY QUALITY STANDARDS RADIO REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY COMMISSIONS REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PROCESS REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH CENTERS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TELEPHONE COMPANIES TELEPHONE SERVICE THINKING TRANSPARENCY UTILITY REGULATION |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS ATTENTION AUTHORITY BELIEFS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS COST ANALYSIS DISCUSSION GROUPS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORIES ECONOMISTS ENTERTAINMENT LAW FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISTRESS FISCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INTELLIGENCE LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP LEARNING LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY MEDIA MINISTERS MODELING MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OIL ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PROGRAMS PUBLIC POLICY QUALITY STANDARDS RADIO REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY COMMISSIONS REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PROCESS REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH CENTERS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TELEPHONE COMPANIES TELEPHONE SERVICE THINKING TRANSPARENCY UTILITY REGULATION Jamison, Mark A. Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3620 |
| description |
Being a utility regulator has perils because the independence of the regulator necessarily removes power from politicians, operators, and others. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved in shaping the policies that they are supposed to implement. As a result of such frictions, regulators are sometimes removed from office or marginalized in some way. How can regulators not only survive in such an environment, but also thrive? Jamison describes a leadership concept called adaptive leadership that regulators can use to help their countries adapt to new policies and changing situations, while allowing the regulator to stay in the game. The first leadership skill he discusses is the ability to get on the balcony to see what is really going on with operators, politicians, consumers, and others. Once this perspective is obtained, then the regulator can engage stakeholders in an adaptive process in which people make necessary changes to traditions and expectations, while hanging on to the things that are truly important. Regulators can do this by bringing attention to problems that people want to ignore because they involve difficult tradeoffs, providing certainty and stability when tensions become too high for work to be done, and keeping attention focused on the work and the issues. |
| format |
Publications & Research |
| author |
Jamison, Mark A. |
| author_facet |
Jamison, Mark A. |
| author_sort |
Jamison, Mark A. |
| title |
Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| title_short |
Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| title_full |
Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| title_fullStr |
Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Leadership and the Independent Regulator |
| title_sort |
leadership and the independent regulator |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6030514/leadership-independent-regulator http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8217 |
| _version_ |
1764407533389217792 |