Leadership and the Independent Regulator

Leadership and the Independent Regulator

Being a utility regulator has perils because the independence of the regulator necessarily removes power from politicians, operators, and others. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved in shaping the policies that they are supposed to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jamison, Mark A.
Format: Publications & Research
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS
ATTENTION
AUTHORITY
BELIEFS
CITIZENS
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
CONSENSUS
COST ANALYSIS
DISCUSSION GROUPS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC THEORIES
ECONOMISTS
ENTERTAINMENT LAW
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL DISTRESS
FISCAL
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
LABOR UNION
LEADERSHIP
LEARNING
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
MEDIA
MINISTERS
MODELING
MONOPOLIES
MONOPOLY
OIL
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY
POLICY DECISIONS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICIANS
PRESIDENTS
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC POLICY
QUALITY STANDARDS
RADIO
REGULATOR
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
REGULATORY AGENCY
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
REGULATORY POLICY
REGULATORY PROCESS
REPRESENTATIVES
RESEARCH CENTERS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
TELEPHONE COMPANIES
TELEPHONE SERVICE
THINKING
TRANSPARENCY
UTILITY REGULATION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6030514/leadership-independent-regulator
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8217

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6030514/leadership-independent-regulator
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8217

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