Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia
This paper presents an evaluation of multiple variants of a commonly used intervention to boost education in developing countries - the conditional cash transfer - with a student level randomization that allows the authors to generate intra-family...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9362547/conditional-cash-transfers-education-design-features-peer-sibling-effects-evidence-randomized-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6726 |
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okr-10986-6726 |
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oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACADEMIC OPPORTUNITIES ACADEMIC YEAR ACCESS TO INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE DATA ADMINISTRATIVE FEES ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AGE GROUPS ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AMOUNT OF MONEY ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL AVERAGE ATTENDANCE BANKS BASIC EDUCATION BENEFICIARIES BIASES CASH TRANSFER CASH TRANSFERS CHILD LABOR CHURCHES CLASSROOM COMMUNITY LEADERS CONTRIBUTION COST OF EDUCATION CURRICULUM DAILY ATTENDANCE DATA ON STUDENTS DEBIT CARD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS DIRECT COSTS EARNINGS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ELIGIBLE CHILDREN ELIGIBLE STUDENTS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE ENROLLMENT RATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FAMILY INCOME FAMILY MEMBERS FARMERS FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORMAL SAVINGS FRIENDSHIP NETWORK FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS FUTURE INCOME GENDER GIRLS GRADE LEVELS GRADUATION RATES HIGHER EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION HIGHER ENROLLMENT HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS INCOME LEVEL INDEXES INFLATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVENTIONS LABOR MARKET LARGE EXPENSE LARGE EXPENSES LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LEVELS OF ENROLLMENT LITERATURE LONG-TERM SAVINGS LOW INCOME LOW-INCOME LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS LOWER INCOME LOWER SECONDARY LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL MAJOR BANKS MINISTRY OF EDUCATION NET ENROLLMENT NUTRITION OLDER CHILDREN PAPERS PEER GROUP PRIMARY EDUCATION PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC EDUCATION PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS QUALITY OF EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIPT REGISTRATION PROCESS RESEARCHERS RESPONSIBILITIES RURAL STUDENTS SAVING MONEY SAVINGS SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS SCHOLARSHIPS SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS SCHOOL SUPPLIES SCHOOL VISITS SCHOOLING SECONDARY ENROLLMENT SECONDARY SCHOOL SMALLER NUMBER SOCIAL NETWORK SOURCE OF INFORMATION STUDENT RETENTION SUBJECTS TARGET POPULATIONS TEACHERS TERTIARY ENROLLMENT TERTIARY INSTITUTION TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS TERTIARY LEVELS TRADITIONAL UNIVERSITIES TYPES OF STUDENTS URBAN AREAS VALUATION VILLAGE VILLAGES VOCATIONAL SCHOOL VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS VOUCHERS WAGES WORK HOURS |
| spellingShingle |
ACADEMIC OPPORTUNITIES ACADEMIC YEAR ACCESS TO INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE DATA ADMINISTRATIVE FEES ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AGE GROUPS ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AMOUNT OF MONEY ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL AVERAGE ATTENDANCE BANKS BASIC EDUCATION BENEFICIARIES BIASES CASH TRANSFER CASH TRANSFERS CHILD LABOR CHURCHES CLASSROOM COMMUNITY LEADERS CONTRIBUTION COST OF EDUCATION CURRICULUM DAILY ATTENDANCE DATA ON STUDENTS DEBIT CARD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS DIRECT COSTS EARNINGS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ELIGIBLE CHILDREN ELIGIBLE STUDENTS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE ENROLLMENT RATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FAMILY INCOME FAMILY MEMBERS FARMERS FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORMAL SAVINGS FRIENDSHIP NETWORK FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS FUTURE INCOME GENDER GIRLS GRADE LEVELS GRADUATION RATES HIGHER EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION HIGHER ENROLLMENT HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS INCOME LEVEL INDEXES INFLATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVENTIONS LABOR MARKET LARGE EXPENSE LARGE EXPENSES LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LEVELS OF ENROLLMENT LITERATURE LONG-TERM SAVINGS LOW INCOME LOW-INCOME LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS LOWER INCOME LOWER SECONDARY LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL MAJOR BANKS MINISTRY OF EDUCATION NET ENROLLMENT NUTRITION OLDER CHILDREN PAPERS PEER GROUP PRIMARY EDUCATION PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC EDUCATION PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS QUALITY OF EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIPT REGISTRATION PROCESS RESEARCHERS RESPONSIBILITIES RURAL STUDENTS SAVING MONEY SAVINGS SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS SCHOLARSHIPS SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS SCHOOL SUPPLIES SCHOOL VISITS SCHOOLING SECONDARY ENROLLMENT SECONDARY SCHOOL SMALLER NUMBER SOCIAL NETWORK SOURCE OF INFORMATION STUDENT RETENTION SUBJECTS TARGET POPULATIONS TEACHERS TERTIARY ENROLLMENT TERTIARY INSTITUTION TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS TERTIARY LEVELS TRADITIONAL UNIVERSITIES TYPES OF STUDENTS URBAN AREAS VALUATION VILLAGE VILLAGES VOCATIONAL SCHOOL VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS VOUCHERS WAGES WORK HOURS Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Bertrand, Marianne Linden, Leigh L. Perez-Calle, Francisco Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Colombia |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4580 |
| description |
This paper presents an evaluation of
multiple variants of a commonly used intervention to boost
education in developing countries - the conditional cash
transfer - with a student level randomization that allows
the authors to generate intra-family and peer-network
variation. The analysis tests three treatments: a basic
conditional cash transfer treatment based on school
attendance, a savings treatment that postpones a bulk of the
cash transfer due to good attendance to just before children
have to re-enroll, and a tertiary treatment where some of
the transfers are conditional on students' graduation
and tertiary enrollment rather than attendance. On average,
the combined incentives increase attendance, pass rates,
enrollment, graduation rates, and matriculation to tertiary
institutions. Changing the timing of the payments does not
change attendance rates relative to the basic treatment but
does significantly increase enrollment rates at both the
secondary and tertiary levels. Incentives for graduation
and matriculation are particularly effective, increasing
attendance and enrollment at secondary and tertiary levels
more than the basic treatment. There is some evidence that
the subsidies can cause a reallocation of responsibilities
within the household. Siblings (particularly sisters) of
treated students work more and attend school less than
students in families that received no treatment. In
addition, indirect peer influences are relatively strong in
attendance decisions with the average magnitude similar to
that of the direct effect. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Bertrand, Marianne Linden, Leigh L. Perez-Calle, Francisco |
| author_facet |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Bertrand, Marianne Linden, Leigh L. Perez-Calle, Francisco |
| author_sort |
Barrera-Osorio, Felipe |
| title |
Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| title_short |
Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| title_full |
Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| title_fullStr |
Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia |
| title_sort |
conditional cash transfers in education : design features, peer and sibling effects evidence from a randomized experiment in colombia |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9362547/conditional-cash-transfers-education-design-features-peer-sibling-effects-evidence-randomized-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6726 |
| _version_ |
1764400786160222208 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-67262021-04-23T14:02:31Z Conditional Cash Transfers in Education : Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia Barrera-Osorio, Felipe Bertrand, Marianne Linden, Leigh L. Perez-Calle, Francisco ACADEMIC OPPORTUNITIES ACADEMIC YEAR ACCESS TO INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE DATA ADMINISTRATIVE FEES ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AGE GROUPS ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AMOUNT OF MONEY ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL AVERAGE ATTENDANCE BANKS BASIC EDUCATION BENEFICIARIES BIASES CASH TRANSFER CASH TRANSFERS CHILD LABOR CHURCHES CLASSROOM COMMUNITY LEADERS CONTRIBUTION COST OF EDUCATION CURRICULUM DAILY ATTENDANCE DATA ON STUDENTS DEBIT CARD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS DIRECT COSTS EARNINGS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ELIGIBLE CHILDREN ELIGIBLE STUDENTS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS ENROLLMENT DATA ENROLLMENT RATE ENROLLMENT RATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FAMILY INCOME FAMILY MEMBERS FARMERS FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FORMAL SAVINGS FRIENDSHIP NETWORK FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS FUTURE INCOME GENDER GIRLS GRADE LEVELS GRADUATION RATES HIGHER EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION HIGHER ENROLLMENT HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS INCOME LEVEL INDEXES INFLATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVENTIONS LABOR MARKET LARGE EXPENSE LARGE EXPENSES LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LEVELS OF ENROLLMENT LITERATURE LONG-TERM SAVINGS LOW INCOME LOW-INCOME LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS LOWER INCOME LOWER SECONDARY LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL MAJOR BANKS MINISTRY OF EDUCATION NET ENROLLMENT NUTRITION OLDER CHILDREN PAPERS PEER GROUP PRIMARY EDUCATION PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC EDUCATION PUBLIC SCHOOL PUBLIC SCHOOLS QUALITY OF EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIPT REGISTRATION PROCESS RESEARCHERS RESPONSIBILITIES RURAL STUDENTS SAVING MONEY SAVINGS SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS SCHOLARSHIPS SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS SCHOOL SUPPLIES SCHOOL VISITS SCHOOLING SECONDARY ENROLLMENT SECONDARY SCHOOL SMALLER NUMBER SOCIAL NETWORK SOURCE OF INFORMATION STUDENT RETENTION SUBJECTS TARGET POPULATIONS TEACHERS TERTIARY ENROLLMENT TERTIARY INSTITUTION TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS TERTIARY LEVELS TRADITIONAL UNIVERSITIES TYPES OF STUDENTS URBAN AREAS VALUATION VILLAGE VILLAGES VOCATIONAL SCHOOL VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS VOUCHERS WAGES WORK HOURS This paper presents an evaluation of multiple variants of a commonly used intervention to boost education in developing countries - the conditional cash transfer - with a student level randomization that allows the authors to generate intra-family and peer-network variation. The analysis tests three treatments: a basic conditional cash transfer treatment based on school attendance, a savings treatment that postpones a bulk of the cash transfer due to good attendance to just before children have to re-enroll, and a tertiary treatment where some of the transfers are conditional on students' graduation and tertiary enrollment rather than attendance. On average, the combined incentives increase attendance, pass rates, enrollment, graduation rates, and matriculation to tertiary institutions. Changing the timing of the payments does not change attendance rates relative to the basic treatment but does significantly increase enrollment rates at both the secondary and tertiary levels. Incentives for graduation and matriculation are particularly effective, increasing attendance and enrollment at secondary and tertiary levels more than the basic treatment. There is some evidence that the subsidies can cause a reallocation of responsibilities within the household. Siblings (particularly sisters) of treated students work more and attend school less than students in families that received no treatment. In addition, indirect peer influences are relatively strong in attendance decisions with the average magnitude similar to that of the direct effect. 2012-05-30T22:17:50Z 2012-05-30T22:17:50Z 2008-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9362547/conditional-cash-transfers-education-design-features-peer-sibling-effects-evidence-randomized-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6726 English Policy Research Working Paper No. 4580 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Colombia |