An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approxima...

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Main Authors:	Avalos, Marcos, De Hoyos, Rafael E.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410

id	okr-10986-6410
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-64102021-04-23T14:02:31Z An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger. 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z 2012-05-25T14:25:04Z 2008-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4527 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
spellingShingle	ACCURATE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW BARGAINING BARRIERS TO ENTRY CLAIM COMPETITION COMMISSION COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITORS DECISION MAKING DEPENDENT DOMINANT FIRM ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY EQUITY SHARE EQUITY SHARES EXPANSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FUTURE RESEARCH HORIZONTAL MERGER IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION JUDGE JUDGMENTS JUDICIAL REVIEW LAWYERS LEGAL PROCESS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MARKET ENTRY MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY SHARES OF FIRM SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4527
description	A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E.
author_facet	Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E.
author_sort	Avalos, Marcos
title	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_short	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_full	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_fullStr	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_full_unstemmed	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_sort	empirical analysis of mexican merger policy
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410
_version_	1764400323813703680

An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

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