An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approxima...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Avalos, Marcos, De Hoyos, Rafael E.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ACCURATE INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ANTITRUST
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
ANTITRUST LAW
BARGAINING
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
CLAIM
COMPETITION COMMISSION
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITORS
DECISION MAKING
DEPENDENT
DOMINANT FIRM
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMETRIC MODELS
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMIC COMPETITION
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ECONOMIC MODELS
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
EMPLOYMENT
EQUALITY
EQUITY SHARE
EQUITY SHARES
EXPANSION
EXPECTED VALUE
EXPORTS
FIRMS
FOREIGN COMPANY
FOREIGN FIRM
FOREIGN FIRMS
FUTURE RESEARCH
HORIZONTAL MERGER
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
JUDGE
JUDGMENTS
JUDICIAL REVIEW
LAWYERS
LEGAL PROCESS
LIMITED
MAJORITY VOTE
MARKET ENTRY
MERGER
MERGER CONTROL
MERGERS
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
MONOPOLIES
MONOPOLY
SHARES OF FIRM
SMALL FIRM
SMALL FIRMS
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9026843/empirical-analysis-mexican-merger-policy
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6410

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