Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity

Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jacoby, Hanan G., Mansuri, Ghazala
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5876
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recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-58762021-04-23T14:02:23Z Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision. 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2009 Journal Article Journal of Development Economics 03043878 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5876 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Pakistan
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Economic Development: Agriculture
Natural Resources
Energy
Environment
Other Primary Products O130
Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses
Transportation O180
Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120
spellingShingle Economic Development: Agriculture
Natural Resources
Energy
Environment
Other Primary Products O130
Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses
Transportation O180
Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120
Jacoby, Hanan G.
Mansuri, Ghazala
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
geographic_facet Pakistan
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision.
format Journal Article
author Jacoby, Hanan G.
Mansuri, Ghazala
author_facet Jacoby, Hanan G.
Mansuri, Ghazala
author_sort Jacoby, Hanan G.
title Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
title_short Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
title_full Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
title_fullStr Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
title_full_unstemmed Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
title_sort incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5876
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