Investment without Democracy : Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies

Investment without Democracy : Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gehlbach, Scott, Keefer, Philip
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720
Capital
Investment
Capacity E220
Economic Development: Financial Markets
Saving and Capital Investment
Corporate Finance and Governance O160
Formal and Informal Sectors
Shadow Economy
Institutional Arrangements O170
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies : Political Economy
Property Rights P260
Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Financial Economics P340
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5768

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5768

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