A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ens...
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okr-10986-54642021-04-23T14:02:22Z A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries Brueckner, Jan K. Selod, Harris Economic Development: Human Resources Human Development Income Distribution Migration O150 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Land Use Patterns R140 This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. 2012-03-30T07:32:57Z 2012-03-30T07:32:57Z 2009 Journal Article American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 19457731 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5464 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article |
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Foreign Institution |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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EN |
topic |
Economic Development: Human Resources Human Development Income Distribution Migration O150 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Land Use Patterns R140 |
spellingShingle |
Economic Development: Human Resources Human Development Income Distribution Migration O150 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Land Use Patterns R140 Brueckner, Jan K. Selod, Harris A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
relation |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
description |
This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Brueckner, Jan K. Selod, Harris |
author_facet |
Brueckner, Jan K. Selod, Harris |
author_sort |
Brueckner, Jan K. |
title |
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
title_short |
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
title_full |
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
title_fullStr |
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries |
title_sort |
theory of urban squatting and land-tenure formalization in developing countries |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5464 |
_version_ |
1764395140451926016 |