A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ens...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Brueckner, Jan K., Selod, Harris
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5464
id okr-10986-5464
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-54642021-04-23T14:02:22Z A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries Brueckner, Jan K. Selod, Harris Economic Development: Human Resources Human Development Income Distribution Migration O150 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Land Use Patterns R140 This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. 2012-03-30T07:32:57Z 2012-03-30T07:32:57Z 2009 Journal Article American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 19457731 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5464 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Economic Development: Human Resources
Human Development
Income Distribution
Migration O150
Land Ownership and Tenure
Land Reform
Land Use
Irrigation
Agriculture and Environment Q150
Land Use Patterns R140
spellingShingle Economic Development: Human Resources
Human Development
Income Distribution
Migration O150
Land Ownership and Tenure
Land Reform
Land Use
Irrigation
Agriculture and Environment Q150
Land Use Patterns R140
Brueckner, Jan K.
Selod, Harris
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies.
format Journal Article
author Brueckner, Jan K.
Selod, Harris
author_facet Brueckner, Jan K.
Selod, Harris
author_sort Brueckner, Jan K.
title A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
title_short A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
title_full A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
title_fullStr A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
title_full_unstemmed A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
title_sort theory of urban squatting and land-tenure formalization in developing countries
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5464
_version_ 1764395140451926016