A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collecti...

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Main Authors:	Reichhuber, Anke, Camacho, Eva, Requate, Till
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882

id	okr-10986-4882
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-48822021-04-23T14:02:20Z A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210 We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments. 2012-03-30T07:30:12Z 2012-03-30T07:30:12Z 2009 Journal Article Environment and Development Economics 1355770X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Ethiopia
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210
spellingShingle	Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210 Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
geographic_facet	Ethiopia
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.
format	Journal Article
author	Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till
author_facet	Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till
author_sort	Reichhuber, Anke
title	A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
title_short	A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
title_full	A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
title_fullStr	A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
title_full_unstemmed	A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
title_sort	framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with ethiopian farmers
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882
_version_	1764393097112846336

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

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