A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collecti...
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okr-10986-48822021-04-23T14:02:20Z A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210 We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments. 2012-03-30T07:30:12Z 2012-03-30T07:30:12Z 2009 Journal Article Environment and Development Economics 1355770X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Ethiopia |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
EN |
topic |
Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210 |
spellingShingle |
Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Land Ownership and Tenure Land Reform Land Use Irrigation Agriculture and Environment Q150 Agricultural Policy Food Policy Q180 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210 Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
geographic_facet |
Ethiopia |
relation |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
description |
We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till |
author_facet |
Reichhuber, Anke Camacho, Eva Requate, Till |
author_sort |
Reichhuber, Anke |
title |
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
title_short |
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
title_full |
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
title_fullStr |
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers |
title_sort |
framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with ethiopian farmers |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882 |
_version_ |
1764393097112846336 |