Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages...

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Main Authors: Benitez, Daniel, Gonzalez, Aldo
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
ACQUISITIONS
ANTITRUST LAW
ASSET VALUE
COLLUSION
COMPANY
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE COUNSEL
COUNSEL
COURT OF JUSTICE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
EQUALITY
EX ANTE
EX POST
EX ­ POST
EX ­POST
EXPECTED VALUE
FIRMS
HORIZONTAL MERGER
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
INTERESTED PARTIES
INVESTIGATION
LIMITED
MANDATE
MERGER
MERGER CONTROL
MERGERS
MONETARY VALUE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PARTY
PENALTY
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION
REMEDIES
REMEDY
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130
id okr-10986-4130
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-41302021-04-23T14:02:15Z Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes Benitez, Daniel Gonzalez, Aldo ACQUISITIONS ANTITRUST LAW ASSET VALUE COLLUSION COMPANY COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE COUNSEL COUNSEL COURT OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EQUALITY EX ANTE EX POST EX ­ POST EX ­POST EXPECTED VALUE FIRMS HORIZONTAL MERGER INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION INTERESTED PARTIES INVESTIGATION LIMITED MANDATE MERGER MERGER CONTROL MERGERS MONETARY VALUE NASH EQUILIBRIUM PARTY PENALTY PREMERGER NOTIFICATION REMEDIES REMEDY The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more information -verifiable and non verifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firms reveals useful information to the agency about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, improving further the advantage of the voluntary mechanism. 2012-03-19T19:10:29Z 2012-03-19T19:10:29Z 2009-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4936 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACQUISITIONS
ANTITRUST LAW
ASSET VALUE
COLLUSION
COMPANY
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE COUNSEL
COUNSEL
COURT OF JUSTICE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
EQUALITY
EX ANTE
EX POST
EX ­ POST
EX ­POST
EXPECTED VALUE
FIRMS
HORIZONTAL MERGER
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
INTERESTED PARTIES
INVESTIGATION
LIMITED
MANDATE
MERGER
MERGER CONTROL
MERGERS
MONETARY VALUE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PARTY
PENALTY
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION
REMEDIES
REMEDY
spellingShingle ACQUISITIONS
ANTITRUST LAW
ASSET VALUE
COLLUSION
COMPANY
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE COUNSEL
COUNSEL
COURT OF JUSTICE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
EQUALITY
EX ANTE
EX POST
EX ­ POST
EX ­POST
EXPECTED VALUE
FIRMS
HORIZONTAL MERGER
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
INTERESTED PARTIES
INVESTIGATION
LIMITED
MANDATE
MERGER
MERGER CONTROL
MERGERS
MONETARY VALUE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PARTY
PENALTY
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION
REMEDIES
REMEDY
Benitez, Daniel
Gonzalez, Aldo
Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
geographic_facet The World Region
The World Region
relation Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4936
description The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more information -verifiable and non verifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firms reveals useful information to the agency about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, improving further the advantage of the voluntary mechanism.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Benitez, Daniel
Gonzalez, Aldo
author_facet Benitez, Daniel
Gonzalez, Aldo
author_sort Benitez, Daniel
title Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
title_short Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
title_full Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
title_fullStr Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes
title_sort optimal pre-merger notification mechanisms : incentives and efficiency of mandatory and voluntary schemes
publishDate 2012
url http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130
_version_ 1764390047062163456

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