Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Benitez, Daniel, Gonzalez, Aldo
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
ACQUISITIONS
ANTITRUST LAW
ASSET VALUE
COLLUSION
COMPANY
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE COUNSEL
COUNSEL
COURT OF JUSTICE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
EQUALITY
EX ANTE
EX POST
EX ­ POST
EX ­POST
EXPECTED VALUE
FIRMS
HORIZONTAL MERGER
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
INTERESTED PARTIES
INVESTIGATION
LIMITED
MANDATE
MERGER
MERGER CONTROL
MERGERS
MONETARY VALUE
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PARTY
PENALTY
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION
REMEDIES
REMEDY
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130

Internet

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090519085418
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4130

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