Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina

What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? This paper quantitatively shows that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources acr...

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Main Author:	Zaourak, Gabriel
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2020
Subjects:	RENT SEEKING MISALLOCATION INNOVATION FIRM PERFORMANCE PRODUCTIVITY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820261592919425775/Rent-Seeking-Activities-Misallocation-and-Innovation-in-Argentina http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33988

id	okr-10986-33988
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-339882022-09-20T00:12:40Z Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina Zaourak, Gabriel RENT SEEKING MISALLOCATION INNOVATION FIRM PERFORMANCE PRODUCTIVITY What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? This paper quantitatively shows that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive firms, reallocating resources instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms because rent-seeking drives resources away from innovation. These two channels can help in understanding why Argentina has more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development, compared with developed economies, explaining a sizable portion of Argentina's low productivity. 2020-06-25T15:14:33Z 2020-06-25T15:14:33Z 2020-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820261592919425775/Rent-Seeking-Activities-Misallocation-and-Innovation-in-Argentina http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33988 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9293 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Argentina
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	RENT SEEKING MISALLOCATION INNOVATION FIRM PERFORMANCE PRODUCTIVITY
spellingShingle	RENT SEEKING MISALLOCATION INNOVATION FIRM PERFORMANCE PRODUCTIVITY Zaourak, Gabriel Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Argentina
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9293
description	What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? This paper quantitatively shows that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive firms, reallocating resources instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms because rent-seeking drives resources away from innovation. These two channels can help in understanding why Argentina has more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development, compared with developed economies, explaining a sizable portion of Argentina's low productivity.
format	Working Paper
author	Zaourak, Gabriel
author_facet	Zaourak, Gabriel
author_sort	Zaourak, Gabriel
title	Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
title_short	Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
title_full	Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
title_fullStr	Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed	Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina
title_sort	rent-seeking activities, misallocation, and innovation in argentina
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2020
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820261592919425775/Rent-Seeking-Activities-Misallocation-and-Innovation-in-Argentina http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33988
_version_	1764479945225011200

Rent-Seeking Activities, Misallocation, and Innovation in Argentina

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