Government Guarantees, Transparency, and Bank Risk-Taking

Government Guarantees, Transparency, and Bank Risk-Taking

This paper presents a model of bank risk taking and government guarantees. Levered banks take excessive risk, as their actions are not fully priced at the margin by debt holders. The impact of government guarantees on bank risk taking depends criti...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cordella, Tito, Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Marquez, Robert
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:
banking
risk
transparency
government guarantees
bailouts
moral hazard
value effect
leverage
risk pricing
risk taking
debt holders
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/468401487165710483/Government-guarantees-transparency-and-bank-risk-taking
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26138

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/468401487165710483/Government-guarantees-transparency-and-bank-risk-taking
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26138

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