Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India
Experiments in the United States have found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form socially efficient conventions in coordination games of common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows that this ability is not universal...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145 |
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okr-10986-251452021-04-23T14:04:29Z Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India Brooks, Benjamin Hoff, Karla Pandey, Priyanka culture honor caste coordination conventions framing Stag Hunt learning Experiments in the United States have found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form socially efficient conventions in coordination games of common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows that this ability is not universal. The paper reports the results of a field experiment in India in which pairs of men from high and low castes repeatedly played a coordination game of common interest. Low-caste pairs overwhelmingly coordinated on the efficient equilibrium, consistent with earlier findings. In contrast, high-caste pairs coordinated on the efficient equilibrium at a much lower rate, with only 47 percent in efficient coordination in the final period of the experiment. The study traces the divergence in outcomes to how an individual responds to the low payoff he obtains when he attempts efficient coordination but his partner does not. After this event, high-caste men are significantly less likely than low-caste men to continue trying for efficiency. The limited ability to form the efficient convention can be explained by the framing effect of the culture of honor among high-caste men, which may lead them to interpret this event as a challenge to their honor, which triggers a retaliatory response. 2016-10-13T19:12:02Z 2016-10-13T19:12:02Z 2016-09 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7829 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
culture honor caste coordination conventions framing Stag Hunt learning |
| spellingShingle |
culture honor caste coordination conventions framing Stag Hunt learning Brooks, Benjamin Hoff, Karla Pandey, Priyanka Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7829 |
| description |
Experiments in the United States have
found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form
socially efficient conventions in coordination games of
common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows
that this ability is not universal. The paper reports the
results of a field experiment in India in which pairs of men
from high and low castes repeatedly played a coordination
game of common interest. Low-caste pairs overwhelmingly
coordinated on the efficient equilibrium, consistent with
earlier findings. In contrast, high-caste pairs coordinated
on the efficient equilibrium at a much lower rate, with only
47 percent in efficient coordination in the final period of
the experiment. The study traces the divergence in outcomes
to how an individual responds to the low payoff he obtains
when he attempts efficient coordination but his partner does
not. After this event, high-caste men are significantly less
likely than low-caste men to continue trying for efficiency.
The limited ability to form the efficient convention can be
explained by the framing effect of the culture of honor
among high-caste men, which may lead them to interpret this
event as a challenge to their honor, which triggers a
retaliatory response. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Brooks, Benjamin Hoff, Karla Pandey, Priyanka |
| author_facet |
Brooks, Benjamin Hoff, Karla Pandey, Priyanka |
| author_sort |
Brooks, Benjamin |
| title |
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| title_short |
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| title_full |
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| title_fullStr |
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India |
| title_sort |
can the culture of honor lead to inefficient conventions? : experimental evidence from india |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145 |
| _version_ |
1764458664668692480 |