Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India

Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India

Experiments in the United States have found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form socially efficient conventions in coordination games of common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows that this ability is not universal...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Brooks, Benjamin, Hoff, Karla, Pandey, Priyanka
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:
culture
honor
caste
coordination
conventions
framing
Stag Hunt
learning
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145

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