Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? : Experimental Evidence from India
Experiments in the United States have found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form socially efficient conventions in coordination games of common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows that this ability is not universal...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145 |
| Summary: | Experiments in the United States have
found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form
socially efficient conventions in coordination games of
common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows
that this ability is not universal. The paper reports the
results of a field experiment in India in which pairs of men
from high and low castes repeatedly played a coordination
game of common interest. Low-caste pairs overwhelmingly
coordinated on the efficient equilibrium, consistent with
earlier findings. In contrast, high-caste pairs coordinated
on the efficient equilibrium at a much lower rate, with only
47 percent in efficient coordination in the final period of
the experiment. The study traces the divergence in outcomes
to how an individual responds to the low payoff he obtains
when he attempts efficient coordination but his partner does
not. After this event, high-caste men are significantly less
likely than low-caste men to continue trying for efficiency.
The limited ability to form the efficient convention can be
explained by the framing effect of the culture of honor
among high-caste men, which may lead them to interpret this
event as a challenge to their honor, which triggers a
retaliatory response. |
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