Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia)
The state-owned enterprise (SOE) landscape has become increasingly diverse. There used to be some relatively well-defined criteria, but with the growing complexity of state participation in the economy, there is no longer a uniform definition, and...
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2015
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24950067/middle-east-north-africa-governance-reforms-state-owned-enterprises-soes-lessons-four-case-studies-egypt-iraq-morocco-tunisia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22749 |
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okr-10986-227492021-04-23T14:04:10Z Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) World Bank PRIVATIZATION PROCEEDS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REVOLUTION DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PUBLIC PROCUREMENT FINANCING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LEGAL STRUCTURES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR STATE PARTICIPATION GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICIANS GOOD GOVERNANCE SOCIAL SAFETY NET HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE INDEPENDENCE PUBLIC FUNDING OVERSIGHT MINISTERS STATE BANKS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FINANCIAL AUDITS REGULATORY BODY HUMAN RESOURCE PUBLIC POLICY STATES FOREIGN TRADE STATE FUNDING LACK OF TRANSPARENCY STATE OWNERSHIP EXECUTION LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AUTHORITY INFORMAL ECONOMY DECREE PUBLIC FUNDS EMBEZZLEMENT POLITICAL POWER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL SAFETY MINISTRIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTRALIZATION LEGISLATION PUBLIC FINANCE REPRESENTATIVES SOCIAL RETURNS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK PUBLIC INVESTMENT FISCAL HUMAN CAPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY TRANSPARENCY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY PUBLIC POLICIES NATIONALIZATION STATE ENTERPRISES POLITICAL CONTROL STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES FOREIGN INVESTMENT FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE GOVERNMENT REVENUE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE LEGAL FORM DECISION-MAKING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REGULATORY BODIES PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTATION STATE BUDGET BUREAUCRATIC POWER CITIZENS POLITICAL ELITES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY REGIMES SOCIAL POLICIES CONSTITUTION GOVERNANCE ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC RESOURCES FINANCIAL CONTROL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP REGIONS STATE SUBSIDIES STATE CONTROL ENTERPRISE REFORM HUMAN RESOURCES INTERNAL AUDIT MINISTRY OF FINANCE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL RISKS NATIONALISM STATE ASSETS STATE INTERVENTION LAW RISK MANAGEMENT AUDIT POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE The state-owned enterprise (SOE) landscape has become increasingly diverse. There used to be some relatively well-defined criteria, but with the growing complexity of state participation in the economy, there is no longer a uniform definition, and especially because the definition of a SOE has always been country-specific. SOE reforms can have major positive impacts not only by reducing fiscal risks by decreasing hidden subsidies, direct transfers, and overstaffing, but also by strengthening competition and developing capital markets. SOE reforms in developing countries began in the 1960s because of the poor performance of many of the SOEs. The reform movement sought to strengthen the internal capacity of SOEs. To enrich the discussion about possible avenues for performance-enhancing SOE reforms, this report presents the main principles of good governance of SOEs with references to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs (OECD 2005). This document is divided into six parts: (1) an effective legal and regulatory framework for SOEs; (2) the state as an owner; (3) equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) relations with stakeholders; (5) transparency and disclosure; and (6) the responsibilities of the boards of SOEs. 2015-10-08T20:24:31Z 2015-10-08T20:24:31Z 2015-08 Report http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24950067/middle-east-north-africa-governance-reforms-state-owned-enterprises-soes-lessons-four-case-studies-egypt-iraq-morocco-tunisia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22749 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC Economic & Sector Work Economic & Sector Work :: Institutional and Governance Review (IGR) Middle East and North Africa |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
PRIVATIZATION PROCEEDS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REVOLUTION DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PUBLIC PROCUREMENT FINANCING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LEGAL STRUCTURES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR STATE PARTICIPATION GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICIANS GOOD GOVERNANCE SOCIAL SAFETY NET HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE INDEPENDENCE PUBLIC FUNDING OVERSIGHT MINISTERS STATE BANKS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FINANCIAL AUDITS REGULATORY BODY HUMAN RESOURCE PUBLIC POLICY STATES FOREIGN TRADE STATE FUNDING LACK OF TRANSPARENCY STATE OWNERSHIP EXECUTION LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AUTHORITY INFORMAL ECONOMY DECREE PUBLIC FUNDS EMBEZZLEMENT POLITICAL POWER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL SAFETY MINISTRIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTRALIZATION LEGISLATION PUBLIC FINANCE REPRESENTATIVES SOCIAL RETURNS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK PUBLIC INVESTMENT FISCAL HUMAN CAPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY TRANSPARENCY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY PUBLIC POLICIES NATIONALIZATION STATE ENTERPRISES POLITICAL CONTROL STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES FOREIGN INVESTMENT FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE GOVERNMENT REVENUE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE LEGAL FORM DECISION-MAKING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REGULATORY BODIES PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTATION STATE BUDGET BUREAUCRATIC POWER CITIZENS POLITICAL ELITES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY REGIMES SOCIAL POLICIES CONSTITUTION GOVERNANCE ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC RESOURCES FINANCIAL CONTROL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP REGIONS STATE SUBSIDIES STATE CONTROL ENTERPRISE REFORM HUMAN RESOURCES INTERNAL AUDIT MINISTRY OF FINANCE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL RISKS NATIONALISM STATE ASSETS STATE INTERVENTION LAW RISK MANAGEMENT AUDIT POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE |
| spellingShingle |
PRIVATIZATION PROCEEDS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REVOLUTION DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PUBLIC PROCUREMENT FINANCING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LEGAL STRUCTURES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR STATE PARTICIPATION GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICIANS GOOD GOVERNANCE SOCIAL SAFETY NET HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE INDEPENDENCE PUBLIC FUNDING OVERSIGHT MINISTERS STATE BANKS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FINANCIAL AUDITS REGULATORY BODY HUMAN RESOURCE PUBLIC POLICY STATES FOREIGN TRADE STATE FUNDING LACK OF TRANSPARENCY STATE OWNERSHIP EXECUTION LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AUTHORITY INFORMAL ECONOMY DECREE PUBLIC FUNDS EMBEZZLEMENT POLITICAL POWER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL SAFETY MINISTRIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CENTRALIZATION LEGISLATION PUBLIC FINANCE REPRESENTATIVES SOCIAL RETURNS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK PUBLIC INVESTMENT FISCAL HUMAN CAPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY TRANSPARENCY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY PUBLIC POLICIES NATIONALIZATION STATE ENTERPRISES POLITICAL CONTROL STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES FOREIGN INVESTMENT FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE GOVERNMENT REVENUE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE LEGAL FORM DECISION-MAKING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REGULATORY BODIES PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTATION STATE BUDGET BUREAUCRATIC POWER CITIZENS POLITICAL ELITES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PUBLIC DEBT REGULATORY REGIMES SOCIAL POLICIES CONSTITUTION GOVERNANCE ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC RESOURCES FINANCIAL CONTROL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP REGIONS STATE SUBSIDIES STATE CONTROL ENTERPRISE REFORM HUMAN RESOURCES INTERNAL AUDIT MINISTRY OF FINANCE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL RISKS NATIONALISM STATE ASSETS STATE INTERVENTION LAW RISK MANAGEMENT AUDIT POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE World Bank Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| geographic_facet |
Middle East and North Africa |
| description |
The state-owned enterprise (SOE)
landscape has become increasingly diverse. There used to be
some relatively well-defined criteria, but with the growing
complexity of state participation in the economy, there is
no longer a uniform definition, and especially because the
definition of a SOE has always been country-specific. SOE
reforms can have major positive impacts not only by reducing
fiscal risks by decreasing hidden subsidies, direct
transfers, and overstaffing, but also by strengthening
competition and developing capital markets. SOE reforms in
developing countries began in the 1960s because of the poor
performance of many of the SOEs. The reform movement sought
to strengthen the internal capacity of SOEs. To enrich the
discussion about possible avenues for performance-enhancing
SOE reforms, this report presents the main principles of
good governance of SOEs with references to the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines
on corporate governance of SOEs (OECD 2005). This document
is divided into six parts: (1) an effective legal and
regulatory framework for SOEs; (2) the state as an owner;
(3) equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) relations with
stakeholders; (5) transparency and disclosure; and (6) the
responsibilities of the boards of SOEs. |
| format |
Report |
| author |
World Bank |
| author_facet |
World Bank |
| author_sort |
World Bank |
| title |
Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| title_short |
Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| title_full |
Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| title_fullStr |
Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Governance Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises : Lessons from Four Case Studies (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia) |
| title_sort |
governance reforms of state-owned enterprises : lessons from four case studies (egypt, iraq, morocco, and tunisia) |
| publisher |
Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24950067/middle-east-north-africa-governance-reforms-state-owned-enterprises-soes-lessons-four-case-studies-egypt-iraq-morocco-tunisia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22749 |
| _version_ |
1764451829363507200 |