On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the fronti...

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Main Authors:	Mejía, Daniel, Restrepo, Pascual, Rozo, Sandra V.
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:	CHEMICALS POLICIES CROP COCA MILITARY PLANTATIONS SPRAYING TIME MOLASSES POLICE RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS VALIDITY CRIMES INTERDICTION TERRORIST CULTIVATION BANK GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES STRATEGIES FINANCIAL RESOURCES INFORMATION SERVICES FUMIGATION ILLEGAL CROPS CELL PLANTING EFFECTS CRIME SURVEYS POLICY WEEDS MEASURES ESTIMATORS ATTACKS CELLS JUSTICE TERRORIST ATTACK WEIGHT TERRORIST ATTACKS CRIMINALS EVIDENCE PLANTS THEORY THEFTS TECHNIQUES SCIENTISTS ESTIMATING SECURITY SPACE PENALTIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITY GRASSES METHODOLOGIES TESTS SEEDS LABORATORIES YIELDS AERIAL SPRAYING ESTIMATES DOCUMENTS ORGANIZATIONS HERBICIDES AGREEMENT STRATEGY CONFIDENCE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ARMED FORCES ROBBERIES FARMERS GOVERNMENTS CROPS TESTING ATTACK GRANTS POLICE OFFICERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665

id	okr-10986-22665
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-226652021-04-23T14:04:10Z On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V. CHEMICALS POLICIES CROP COCA MILITARY PLANTATIONS SPRAYING TIME MOLASSES POLICE RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS VALIDITY CRIMES INTERDICTION TERRORIST CULTIVATION BANK GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES STRATEGIES FINANCIAL RESOURCES INFORMATION SERVICES FUMIGATION ILLEGAL CROPS CELL PLANTING EFFECTS CRIME SURVEYS POLICY WEEDS MEASURES ESTIMATORS ATTACKS CELLS JUSTICE TERRORIST ATTACK WEIGHT TERRORIST ATTACKS CRIMINALS EVIDENCE PLANTS THEORY THEFTS TECHNIQUES SCIENTISTS ESTIMATING SECURITY SPACE PENALTIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITY GRASSES METHODOLOGIES TESTS SEEDS LABORATORIES YIELDS AERIAL SPRAYING ESTIMATES DOCUMENTS ORGANIZATIONS HERBICIDES AGREEMENT STRATEGY CONFIDENCE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ARMED FORCES ROBBERIES FARMERS GOVERNMENTS CROPS TESTING ATTACK GRANTS POLICE OFFICERS This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. This variation is used to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. The results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia. 2015-09-23T19:53:21Z 2015-09-23T19:53:21Z 2015-09 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7409 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Colombia
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	CHEMICALS POLICIES CROP COCA MILITARY PLANTATIONS SPRAYING TIME MOLASSES POLICE RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS VALIDITY CRIMES INTERDICTION TERRORIST CULTIVATION BANK GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES STRATEGIES FINANCIAL RESOURCES INFORMATION SERVICES FUMIGATION ILLEGAL CROPS CELL PLANTING EFFECTS CRIME SURVEYS POLICY WEEDS MEASURES ESTIMATORS ATTACKS CELLS JUSTICE TERRORIST ATTACK WEIGHT TERRORIST ATTACKS CRIMINALS EVIDENCE PLANTS THEORY THEFTS TECHNIQUES SCIENTISTS ESTIMATING SECURITY SPACE PENALTIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITY GRASSES METHODOLOGIES TESTS SEEDS LABORATORIES YIELDS AERIAL SPRAYING ESTIMATES DOCUMENTS ORGANIZATIONS HERBICIDES AGREEMENT STRATEGY CONFIDENCE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ARMED FORCES ROBBERIES FARMERS GOVERNMENTS CROPS TESTING ATTACK GRANTS POLICE OFFICERS
spellingShingle	CHEMICALS POLICIES CROP COCA MILITARY PLANTATIONS SPRAYING TIME MOLASSES POLICE RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS VALIDITY CRIMES INTERDICTION TERRORIST CULTIVATION BANK GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES STRATEGIES FINANCIAL RESOURCES INFORMATION SERVICES FUMIGATION ILLEGAL CROPS CELL PLANTING EFFECTS CRIME SURVEYS POLICY WEEDS MEASURES ESTIMATORS ATTACKS CELLS JUSTICE TERRORIST ATTACK WEIGHT TERRORIST ATTACKS CRIMINALS EVIDENCE PLANTS THEORY THEFTS TECHNIQUES SCIENTISTS ESTIMATING SECURITY SPACE PENALTIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITY GRASSES METHODOLOGIES TESTS SEEDS LABORATORIES YIELDS AERIAL SPRAYING ESTIMATES DOCUMENTS ORGANIZATIONS HERBICIDES AGREEMENT STRATEGY CONFIDENCE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ARMED FORCES ROBBERIES FARMERS GOVERNMENTS CROPS TESTING ATTACK GRANTS POLICE OFFICERS Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V. On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
geographic_facet	Colombia
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7409
description	This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. This variation is used to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. The results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia.
format	Working Paper
author	Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V.
author_facet	Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V.
author_sort	Mejía, Daniel
title	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_short	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_full	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_fullStr	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_full_unstemmed	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_sort	on the effects of enforcement on illegal markets : evidence from a quasi-experiment in colombia
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2015
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665
_version_	1764451710729715712

On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

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