Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance
Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where a...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608 |
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okr-10986-206082021-04-23T14:03:59Z Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance Cordella, Antonio Cordella, Tito ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS BASIC BUSINESS PERFORMANCE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS CONTROL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIGITAL E-GOVERNMENT E-GOVERNMENT PROJECTS E-MAIL EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT SERVICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES ICT IMAGE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSPECTION INTRINSIC MOTIVATION KNOW HOW LABOR ECONOMICS LEARNING MARGINAL COSTS MEDIA MENU MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPEN ACCESS ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES OUTPUTS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERFORMANCE MEASURES PERFORMANCES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLISHING RESULT RESULTS SEARCH SERVANTS SERVICE DELIVERY STANDARD CONTRACT TEXT WAGES WEB Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents' motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i) monitoring technologies should be introduced only if agents' motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for performance contracts are nonlinear/non-monotonic in agents' motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the agents' "type" is private information, the more and less motivated agents could be separated through a menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay for performance ones. 2014-12-03T14:56:02Z 2014-12-03T14:56:02Z 2014-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance Policy Research Working Paper No. 7128 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7128 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS BASIC BUSINESS PERFORMANCE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS CONTROL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIGITAL E-GOVERNMENT E-GOVERNMENT PROJECTS EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT SERVICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES ICT IMAGE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSPECTION INTRINSIC MOTIVATION KNOW HOW LABOR ECONOMICS LEARNING MARGINAL COSTS MEDIA MENU MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPEN ACCESS ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES OUTPUTS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERFORMANCE MEASURES PERFORMANCES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLISHING RESULT RESULTS SEARCH SERVANTS SERVICE DELIVERY STANDARD CONTRACT TEXT WAGES WEB |
| spellingShingle |
ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS BASIC BUSINESS PERFORMANCE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS CONTROL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIGITAL E-GOVERNMENT E-GOVERNMENT PROJECTS EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT SERVICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES ICT IMAGE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSPECTION INTRINSIC MOTIVATION KNOW HOW LABOR ECONOMICS LEARNING MARGINAL COSTS MEDIA MENU MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPEN ACCESS ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES OUTPUTS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERFORMANCE MEASURES PERFORMANCES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLISHING RESULT RESULTS SEARCH SERVANTS SERVICE DELIVERY STANDARD CONTRACT TEXT WAGES WEB Cordella, Antonio Cordella, Tito Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7128 |
| description |
Monitoring technologies and pay for
performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to
improve public services delivery. Their track record is
however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper
develops a principal agent model where agents'
motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring
technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i)
monitoring technologies should be introduced only if
agents' motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for
performance contracts are nonlinear/non-monotonic in
agents' motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii)
investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and
monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are
motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the
agents' "type" is private information, the
more and less motivated agents could be separated through a
menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance
contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay
for performance ones. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Cordella, Antonio Cordella, Tito |
| author_facet |
Cordella, Antonio Cordella, Tito |
| author_sort |
Cordella, Antonio |
| title |
Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| title_short |
Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| title_full |
Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| title_fullStr |
Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance |
| title_sort |
motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance |
| publisher |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608 |
| _version_ |
1764446889002926080 |