Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance

Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance

Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cordella, Antonio, Cordella, Tito
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank Group, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENTS
BASIC
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
COMPONENTS
CONTROL SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DIGITAL
E-GOVERNMENT
E-GOVERNMENT PROJECTS
E-MAIL
EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
HUMAN RESOURCE
HUMAN RESOURCES
ICT
IMAGE
INCENTIVE PROBLEMS
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INSPECTION
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
KNOW HOW
LABOR ECONOMICS
LEARNING
MARGINAL COSTS
MEDIA
MENU
MORAL HAZARD
MOTIVATION
OPEN ACCESS
ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES
OUTPUTS
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
PERFORMANCES
PRIVATE INFORMATION
PRODUCTIVITY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLISHING
RESULT
RESULTS
SEARCH
SERVANTS
SERVICE DELIVERY
STANDARD CONTRACT
TEXT
WAGES
WEB
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20454325/motivations-monitoring-technologies-pay-performance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20608

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