Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Remuneration of Heterogeneous Inspectors

Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Remuneration of Heterogeneous Inspectors

The author develops a general model for addressing the question of how to compensate tax inspectors in an economy where corruption is pervasive - a model that considers the existence of strategic transmission of information. Most of the literature...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Wane, Waly
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ACCOUNT
ADVERSE SELECTION
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AUDITING
AUDITORS
AUDITS
BENCHMARK
COLLUSION
DISPOSABLE INCOME
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXPECTED VALUE
INCOME
INSPECTORS
MARGINAL COST
MORAL HAZARD
OPTIMIZATION
PRIVATE INFORMATION
REPORTING
RISK NEUTRAL
SIGNALING
TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX COLLECTION
TAX COMPLIANCE
TAX REVENUES
TOTAL REVENUE
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/443640/tax-evasion-corruption-remuneration-heterogeneous-inspectors
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19822

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/443640/tax-evasion-corruption-remuneration-heterogeneous-inspectors
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19822

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