Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s
Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059 |
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okr-10986-18059 |
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oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AUDITING AUTHORITY AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AUTONOMY BANKRUPTCY BUDGET REVENUES BUDGETARY FUNDS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CITIES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT RESTRUCTURING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION DEVOLUTION DIVISION OF POWERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENACTMENT ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUALIZATION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOBBYING LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAX LOCAL TAXES MERITOCRACY METALS MUNICIPAL REVENUES MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL EXPENDITURES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES OIL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES SEPARATION OF POWERS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STREAMS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ARREARS TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTIONS TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SHARING TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES URBAN ECONOMY UTILITIES FISCAL FEDERALISM SUBNATIONAL FINANCES REVENUE MOBILIZATION TAX COLLECTION INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION ENTERPRISE SUPPORT DECENTRALIZATION UTILITIES |
| spellingShingle |
AUDITING AUTHORITY AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AUTONOMY BANKRUPTCY BUDGET REVENUES BUDGETARY FUNDS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CITIES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT RESTRUCTURING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION DEVOLUTION DIVISION OF POWERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENACTMENT ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUALIZATION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOBBYING LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAX LOCAL TAXES MERITOCRACY METALS MUNICIPAL REVENUES MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL EXPENDITURES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES OIL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES SEPARATION OF POWERS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STREAMS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ARREARS TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTIONS TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SHARING TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES URBAN ECONOMY UTILITIES FISCAL FEDERALISM SUBNATIONAL FINANCES REVENUE MOBILIZATION TAX COLLECTION INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION ENTERPRISE SUPPORT DECENTRALIZATION UTILITIES Desai, Raj M. Freinkman, Lev M. Goldberg, Itzhak Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3138 |
| description |
Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis
for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to
serve two roles. First, local control over revenue
collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of
central authorities to tax arbitrarily local capital.
Second, retention of taxes raised locally is meant to
establish incentives for subnational governmental
authorities to foster endemic economic growth as a way of
promoting local tax bases. But in the Russian Federation,
fiscally autonomous regions have often resisted
market-oriented reforms, the enactment of rules protecting
private property, and the dismantling of price controls and
barriers to trade. The authors find statistical evidence in
support of the hypothesis that fiscal incentives of the
Russian regions represent an important determinant of
regional economic performance. The authors also seek to
understand the conditions under which fiscal autonomy
prompts regional growth and recovery, and the conditions
under which it has adverse economic effects. They argue that
the presence of "unearned" income
streams-particularly in the form of revenues from natural
resource production or from budgetary transfers from the
central government-has turned regions dependent on these
income sources into "rentier" regions. As such,
governments in these regions have used local control over
revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms (natural
resource producers or loss-making enterprises) from market
forces. Using new fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from
1996-99, the authors test this central hypothesis in both
single- and simultaneous-equation specifications. Their
results indicate that tax retention (as a proxy for fiscal
autonomy) has a positive effect on the cumulative output
recovery of regions since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
But they also find that this effect decreases as rentable
income streams to regions increase. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Desai, Raj M. Freinkman, Lev M. Goldberg, Itzhak |
| author_facet |
Desai, Raj M. Freinkman, Lev M. Goldberg, Itzhak |
| author_sort |
Desai, Raj M. |
| title |
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| title_short |
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| title_full |
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| title_fullStr |
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s |
| title_sort |
fiscal federalism and regional growth : evidence from the russian federation in the 1990s |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059 |
| _version_ |
1764438826172809216 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-180592021-04-23T14:03:41Z Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s Desai, Raj M. Freinkman, Lev M. Goldberg, Itzhak AUDITING AUTHORITY AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AUTONOMY BANKRUPTCY BUDGET REVENUES BUDGETARY FUNDS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CITIES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT RESTRUCTURING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION DEVOLUTION DIVISION OF POWERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENACTMENT ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUALIZATION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOBBYING LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAX LOCAL TAXES MERITOCRACY METALS MUNICIPAL REVENUES MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL EXPENDITURES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES OIL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES SEPARATION OF POWERS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STREAMS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ARREARS TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTIONS TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SHARING TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES URBAN ECONOMY UTILITIES FISCAL FEDERALISM SUBNATIONAL FINANCES REVENUE MOBILIZATION TAX COLLECTION INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION ENTERPRISE SUPPORT DECENTRALIZATION UTILITIES Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local capital. Second, retention of taxes raised locally is meant to establish incentives for subnational governmental authorities to foster endemic economic growth as a way of promoting local tax bases. But in the Russian Federation, fiscally autonomous regions have often resisted market-oriented reforms, the enactment of rules protecting private property, and the dismantling of price controls and barriers to trade. The authors find statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that fiscal incentives of the Russian regions represent an important determinant of regional economic performance. The authors also seek to understand the conditions under which fiscal autonomy prompts regional growth and recovery, and the conditions under which it has adverse economic effects. They argue that the presence of "unearned" income streams-particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government-has turned regions dependent on these income sources into "rentier" regions. As such, governments in these regions have used local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms (natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises) from market forces. Using new fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996-99, the authors test this central hypothesis in both single- and simultaneous-equation specifications. Their results indicate that tax retention (as a proxy for fiscal autonomy) has a positive effect on the cumulative output recovery of regions since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But they also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase. 2014-04-25T17:08:26Z 2014-04-25T17:08:26Z 2003-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3138 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation |