Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s

Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Desai, Raj M., Freinkman, Lev M., Goldberg, Itzhak
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	AUDITING AUTHORITY AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AUTONOMY BANKRUPTCY BUDGET REVENUES BUDGETARY FUNDS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CITIES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT RESTRUCTURING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION DEVOLUTION DIVISION OF POWERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC IMPACT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORM EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENACTMENT ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUALIZATION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL POLICIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL INCENTIVES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES HOUSING HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOBBYING LOCAL ENTERPRISES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAX LOCAL TAXES MERITOCRACY METALS MUNICIPAL REVENUES MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL EXPENDITURES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES OIL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SHARING SCHEMES SEPARATION OF POWERS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STREAMS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ARREARS TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTIONS TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SHARING TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES URBAN ECONOMY UTILITIES FISCAL FEDERALISM SUBNATIONAL FINANCES REVENUE MOBILIZATION TAX COLLECTION INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION ENTERPRISE SUPPORT UTILITIES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/2542334/fiscal-federalism-regional-growth-evidence-russian-federation-1990s
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18059

Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s

Internet

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