Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribut...
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 |
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okr-10986-180462021-04-23T14:03:41Z Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia. 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2003-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION |
spellingShingle |
CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156 |
description |
The authors provide a new approach to
the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as
ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing
fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a
model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to
the generation of information and describing how incentives
for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and
customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors
show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an
ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically,
the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in
the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not
have significant impact in Indonesia. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo |
author_facet |
Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo |
author_sort |
Anson, Jose |
title |
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
title_short |
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
title_full |
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
title_fullStr |
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? |
title_sort |
tariff evasion and customs corruption : does pre-shipment inspection help? |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 |
_version_ |
1764438753116422144 |