Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribut...

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Main Authors:	Anson, Jose, Cadot, Olivier, Olarreaga, Marcelo
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046

id	okr-10986-18046
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-180462021-04-23T14:03:41Z Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia. 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2003-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION
spellingShingle	CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156
description	The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_facet	Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_sort	Anson, Jose
title	Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_short	Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_full	Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_fullStr	Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_full_unstemmed	Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_sort	tariff evasion and customs corruption : does pre-shipment inspection help?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046
_version_	1764438753116422144

Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

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