Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribut...

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Main Authors: Anson, Jose, Cadot, Olivier, Olarreaga, Marcelo
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046
id okr-10986-18046
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-180462021-04-23T14:03:41Z Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? Anson, Jose Cadot, Olivier Olarreaga, Marcelo CORRUPT PRACTICES CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION TARIFF POLICY INSPECTIONS FRAUD COLLUSION CUSTOMS OPERATIONS CUSTOMS OFFENCES INVOICES TAX ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION COLLECTION SHIPMENT OF GOODS CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS BARGAINING POWER BILATERAL FLOWS CAPITAL EQUIPMENT CIF CLEARANCE TIMES CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CORRUPTION CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS CUSTOMS INSPECTION CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC REGULATIONS EXPORT FLOWS EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORT DUTIES IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INTERNAL INCENTIVES OUTSOURCING PORTS PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES PSI SHIPMENT SHIPMENTS SMUGGLING TARIFF LINES TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REGIME VER AIRPORTS CUSTOMS VALUATION The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia. 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2014-04-25T15:53:38Z 2003-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic CORRUPT PRACTICES
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
TARIFF POLICY
INSPECTIONS
FRAUD
COLLUSION
CUSTOMS OPERATIONS
CUSTOMS OFFENCES
INVOICES
TAX ADMINISTRATION
INFORMATION COLLECTION
SHIPMENT OF GOODS
CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS
BARGAINING POWER
BILATERAL FLOWS
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
CIF
CLEARANCE TIMES
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
CUSTOMS CORRUPTION
CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS
CUSTOMS INSPECTION
CUSTOMS OFFICERS
CUSTOMS REFORM
DOMESTIC MARKET
DOMESTIC REGULATIONS
EXPORT FLOWS
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES
EXPORTERS
EXPORTING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
IMPORT DUTIES
IMPORTING COUNTRY
IMPORTS
INTERNAL INCENTIVES
OUTSOURCING
PORTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRODUCT CATEGORIES
PSI
SHIPMENT
SHIPMENTS
SMUGGLING
TARIFF LINES
TARIFF RATE
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF REVENUE
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX BASE
TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE DEFLECTION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE REGIME
VER
AIRPORTS
CUSTOMS VALUATION
spellingShingle CORRUPT PRACTICES
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
TARIFF POLICY
INSPECTIONS
FRAUD
COLLUSION
CUSTOMS OPERATIONS
CUSTOMS OFFENCES
INVOICES
TAX ADMINISTRATION
INFORMATION COLLECTION
SHIPMENT OF GOODS
CUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTS
BARGAINING POWER
BILATERAL FLOWS
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
CIF
CLEARANCE TIMES
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
CUSTOMS CORRUPTION
CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS
CUSTOMS INSPECTION
CUSTOMS OFFICERS
CUSTOMS REFORM
DOMESTIC MARKET
DOMESTIC REGULATIONS
EXPORT FLOWS
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES
EXPORTERS
EXPORTING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
IMPORT DUTIES
IMPORTING COUNTRY
IMPORTS
INTERNAL INCENTIVES
OUTSOURCING
PORTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRODUCT CATEGORIES
PSI
SHIPMENT
SHIPMENTS
SMUGGLING
TARIFF LINES
TARIFF RATE
TARIFF RATES
TARIFF REVENUE
TARIFF STRUCTURE
TAX BASE
TAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONS
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE DEFLECTION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE REGIME
VER
AIRPORTS
CUSTOMS VALUATION
Anson, Jose
Cadot, Olivier
Olarreaga, Marcelo
Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3156
description The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Anson, Jose
Cadot, Olivier
Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_facet Anson, Jose
Cadot, Olivier
Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_sort Anson, Jose
title Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_short Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_full Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_fullStr Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_full_unstemmed Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?
title_sort tariff evasion and customs corruption : does pre-shipment inspection help?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/10/2693635/tariff-evasion-customs-corruption-pre-shipment-inspection-help
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046
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