International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability : An Economic Theory Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon

As the Eurozone crisis drags on, it is evident that a part of the problem lies in the architecture of debt and its liabilities within the Eurozone and, more generally, the European Union. This paper argues that a large part of the problem can be mi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Basu, Kaushik, Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:	ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO MONEY ADVERSE SELECTION BANK GUARANTEES BANK LENDING BANK MONITORING BANK OF ENGLAND BANK OF JAPAN BANKRUPT BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY CODE BANKRUPTCY LAW BOND YIELDS BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COSTS BORROWINGS BUSINESS RELATION BUSINESS RELATIONS CAPITAL FLOWS CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CDS CENTRAL BANK CENTRAL BANKS CLOSED ECONOMY COMITY COMMERCIAL BANKS COMMON CURRENCY AREA COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS COMPETITIVE MARKET CONTRACT DESIGN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY COUNTRY DEBT CREDIT FLOWS CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING CROSS DEFAULT CURRENCY DEBT BURDEN DEBT CONTRACT DEBT CRISIS DEBT LIABILITY DEBT REDUCTION DEFAULT PROBABILITY DEFAULT RISK DEFAULT RISKS DEFAULTS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIRECT CREDIT DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY ECONOMIC AGENTS ECONOMIC CRISIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC THOUGHT EFFORT CLAUSE EMERGING ECONOMIES EMERGING MARKET EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES EQUILIBRIUM EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK EXCHANGE RATES EXPECTED RETURN EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INDICATORS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL STABILITY FREE TRADE GAME THEORY GLOBAL MARKETS GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT BONDS GUARANTOR HIGH INTEREST RATE INCOMPLETE MARKETS INEFFICIENCY INITIAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL COURTS INTERNATIONAL CREDIT INTERNATIONAL DEBT INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT BANKS INTERNATIONAL LENDING JOINT LIABILITY LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKET LAST RESORT LAWS LENDER LENDERS LEVERAGE LIABILITY ARRANGEMENT LIMITED LIABILITY LOAN LOAN CONTRACT LOAN GUARANTEE LOW INTEREST RATE MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MARKET EFFICIENCY MARKET FAILURES MICRO-FINANCE MICROFINANCE MONETARY AUTHORITY MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NASH EQUILIBRIUM NORMAL PROFIT PAYOFF POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR BORROWER PRIMARY MARKET PRIVATE PARTY PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PRODUCT MARKETS PROVISION OF LOANS PUBLIC POLICY RECESSION REGULATORY SYSTEM RENEGOTIATION REPAYMENT RETURN RETURNS RISK OF DEFAULT SOCIAL CAPITAL SOVEREIGN BOND SOVEREIGN BONDS SOVEREIGN DEBT SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET SOVEREIGN DEBT PROBLEM SOVEREIGN DEBTS SOVEREIGN DEFAULT SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS SOVEREIGN YIELDS STRUCTURAL CHANGE SUBSIDIARY TRADING TREASURIES TREATIES TREATY TURNOVER UNEMPLOYMENT UNION UNIONS WITHDRAWAL
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18104367/international-lending-sovereign-debt-joint-liability-economic-theory-model-amending-treaty-lisbon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15999

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18104367/international-lending-sovereign-debt-joint-liability-economic-theory-model-amending-treaty-lisbon
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15999

International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability : An Economic Theory Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon

Internet

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