Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict
Most analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it dif...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16625165/follow-leader-collective-action-credible-commitment-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12023 |
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okr-10986-120232021-04-23T14:02:59Z Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict Keefer, Philip AIR FORCE ARMED CONFLICT ARMED FORCES ARMIES ARMORED VEHICLES ARMS ATTACK ATTACKS BARGAINING BATTLE CHILD SOLDIERS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMBATANTS CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICTS CONSTRAINT COUNTERINSURGENCY CRIMINALS DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DOCUMENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ELECTIONS ETHNIC CONFLICT ETHNIC DIVERSITY EXPROPRIATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENOCIDE GUERRILLA GUNS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INSURANCE INSURGENT INSURGENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MILITARIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY READINESS MILITARY RELATIONS MOTIVATION NATIONAL SECURITY OBSERVERS OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR OPPORTUNITY COSTS PEACE POLARIZATION POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS PROPERTY RIGHTS REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS RULE OF LAW SAFETY SAFETY NET SECURITY FORCES SECURITY THREATS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOLDIERS TACTICS THREAT THREATS TRAP TRIGGER UNEMPLOYMENT VETERANS VIETNAM WAR VIOLENCE VOTING RIGHTS WAGES WARS WEAPONS Most analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians: leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by which state capacity is created and a specific reason to regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest. 2013-01-02T15:32:05Z 2013-01-02T15:32:05Z 2012-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16625165/follow-leader-collective-action-credible-commitment-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12023 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;no. 6179 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AIR FORCE ARMED CONFLICT ARMED FORCES ARMIES ARMORED VEHICLES ARMS ATTACK ATTACKS BARGAINING BATTLE CHILD SOLDIERS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMBATANTS CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICTS CONSTRAINT COUNTERINSURGENCY CRIMINALS DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DOCUMENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ELECTIONS ETHNIC CONFLICT ETHNIC DIVERSITY EXPROPRIATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENOCIDE GUERRILLA GUNS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INSURANCE INSURGENT INSURGENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MILITARIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY READINESS MILITARY RELATIONS MOTIVATION NATIONAL SECURITY OBSERVERS OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR OPPORTUNITY COSTS PEACE POLARIZATION POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS PROPERTY RIGHTS REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS RULE OF LAW SAFETY SAFETY NET SECURITY FORCES SECURITY THREATS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOLDIERS TACTICS THREAT THREATS TRAP TRIGGER UNEMPLOYMENT VETERANS VIETNAM WAR VIOLENCE VOTING RIGHTS WAGES WARS WEAPONS |
| spellingShingle |
AIR FORCE ARMED CONFLICT ARMED FORCES ARMIES ARMORED VEHICLES ARMS ATTACK ATTACKS BARGAINING BATTLE CHILD SOLDIERS CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMBATANTS CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICTS CONSTRAINT COUNTERINSURGENCY CRIMINALS DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DOCUMENTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ELECTIONS ETHNIC CONFLICT ETHNIC DIVERSITY EXPROPRIATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENOCIDE GUERRILLA GUNS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INSURANCE INSURGENT INSURGENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MILITARIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY READINESS MILITARY RELATIONS MOTIVATION NATIONAL SECURITY OBSERVERS OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR OPPORTUNITY COSTS PEACE POLARIZATION POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL VIOLENCE PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS PROPERTY RIGHTS REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS RULE OF LAW SAFETY SAFETY NET SECURITY FORCES SECURITY THREATS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOLDIERS TACTICS THREAT THREATS TRAP TRIGGER UNEMPLOYMENT VETERANS VIETNAM WAR VIOLENCE VOTING RIGHTS WAGES WARS WEAPONS Keefer, Philip Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;no. 6179 |
| description |
Most analyses of conflict assume that
conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption
is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement,
group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from
acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make
credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that
groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of
conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on
conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader
decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible
recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians:
leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more
likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding
collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by
which state capacity is created and a specific reason to
regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This
focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce
conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service
delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver
precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow
collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| title_short |
Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| title_full |
Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| title_fullStr |
Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict |
| title_sort |
why follow the leader? collective action, credible commitment and conflict |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16625165/follow-leader-collective-action-credible-commitment-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12023 |
| _version_ |
1764418749556850688 |