Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict
Most analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it dif...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16625165/follow-leader-collective-action-credible-commitment-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12023 |
| Summary: | Most analyses of conflict assume that
conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption
is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement,
group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from
acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make
credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that
groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of
conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on
conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader
decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible
recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians:
leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more
likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding
collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by
which state capacity is created and a specific reason to
regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This
focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce
conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service
delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver
precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow
collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest. |
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