Principal-agent preferences in imperfect markets: theoretical analysis on Murabahah and Ijarah

This paper aims to determine the optimal contract for the principal and the agent in imperfect markets, when murabahah and ijarah are used. The financial contracting enforceability approach is employed to determine the contract that maximizes the value of the firm subject to agents’ constraints w...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ajmi, Hechem, Abd Aziz, Hassanuddeen, Kassim, Salina, Mansour, Walid
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Bank Indonesia Institute 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/
http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/
http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/
http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/1/Prof.%20Hassan%20-%20%20Principal%20Agent%20Preferences_Ijarah%20Murabahah.pdf