Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review

Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studie...

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Main Authors: Banuri, Sheheryar, Eckel, Catherine
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16259932/experiments-culture-corruption-review
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9355
id okr-10986-9355
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-93552021-04-23T14:02:44Z Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review Banuri, Sheheryar Eckel, Catherine ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES ANTICORRUPTION POLICY AUDITING BASIC BELIEFS BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBE PAYERS INDEX BRIBERY BRIBES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CORRUPTION RESEARCH CPI CPI RANKING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES CULTURAL FACTORS CULTURAL STUDIES CULTURES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION EMBEZZLEMENT ETHICS ETHNIC GROUPS EXTORTION FIGURES FREE PRESS GAMES GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM LAWS LITERATURE MAFIA MORALS NEPOTISM OPENNESS PATRONAGE PAYOFF PAYOFFS PETTY CORRUPTION PHILOSOPHY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS PRIVATE GAIN PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLISHING PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REFLECTION REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL HISTORY SOCIAL NORMS SOCIALIZATION TRADITION TRANSPARENCY TRUSTWORTHINESS VILLAGES Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures. 2012-06-29T22:09:13Z 2012-06-29T22:09:13Z 2012-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16259932/experiments-culture-corruption-review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9355 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6064 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
ANTICORRUPTION POLICY
AUDITING
BASIC
BELIEFS
BRIBE
BRIBE PAYERS
BRIBE PAYERS INDEX
BRIBERY
BRIBES
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CORRUPTION RESEARCH
CPI
CPI RANKING
CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES
CULTURAL FACTORS
CULTURAL STUDIES
CULTURES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
DISCRIMINATION
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
EMBEZZLEMENT
ETHICS
ETHNIC GROUPS
EXTORTION
FIGURES
FREE PRESS
GAMES
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INFERENCE
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
JUSTICE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
LAWS
LITERATURE
MAFIA
MORALS
NEPOTISM
OPENNESS
PATRONAGE
PAYOFF
PAYOFFS
PETTY CORRUPTION
PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL LEADERS
PRIVATE GAIN
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIAL
PUBLISHING
PUNISHMENT
RECONSTRUCTION
REFLECTION
REMEDIES
RULE OF LAW
SANCTIONS
SELF-INTEREST
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOCIAL HISTORY
SOCIAL NORMS
SOCIALIZATION
TRADITION
TRANSPARENCY
TRUSTWORTHINESS
VILLAGES
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
ANTICORRUPTION POLICY
AUDITING
BASIC
BELIEFS
BRIBE
BRIBE PAYERS
BRIBE PAYERS INDEX
BRIBERY
BRIBES
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
CORRUPT
CORRUPT ACT
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CORRUPTION RESEARCH
CPI
CPI RANKING
CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES
CULTURAL FACTORS
CULTURAL STUDIES
CULTURES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
DISCRIMINATION
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
EMBEZZLEMENT
ETHICS
ETHNIC GROUPS
EXTORTION
FIGURES
FREE PRESS
GAMES
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INFERENCE
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
JUSTICE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
LAWS
LITERATURE
MAFIA
MORALS
NEPOTISM
OPENNESS
PATRONAGE
PAYOFF
PAYOFFS
PETTY CORRUPTION
PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL LEADERS
PRIVATE GAIN
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIAL
PUBLISHING
PUNISHMENT
RECONSTRUCTION
REFLECTION
REMEDIES
RULE OF LAW
SANCTIONS
SELF-INTEREST
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOCIAL HISTORY
SOCIAL NORMS
SOCIALIZATION
TRADITION
TRANSPARENCY
TRUSTWORTHINESS
VILLAGES
Banuri, Sheheryar
Eckel, Catherine
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6064
description Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Banuri, Sheheryar
Eckel, Catherine
author_facet Banuri, Sheheryar
Eckel, Catherine
author_sort Banuri, Sheheryar
title Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
title_short Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
title_full Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
title_fullStr Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
title_full_unstemmed Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
title_sort experiments in culture and corruption : a review
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16259932/experiments-culture-corruption-review
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9355
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