Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review
Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studie...
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2012
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okr-10986-93552021-04-23T14:02:44Z Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review Banuri, Sheheryar Eckel, Catherine ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES ANTICORRUPTION POLICY AUDITING BASIC BELIEFS BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBE PAYERS INDEX BRIBERY BRIBES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CORRUPTION RESEARCH CPI CPI RANKING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES CULTURAL FACTORS CULTURAL STUDIES CULTURES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION EMBEZZLEMENT ETHICS ETHNIC GROUPS EXTORTION FIGURES FREE PRESS GAMES GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM LAWS LITERATURE MAFIA MORALS NEPOTISM OPENNESS PATRONAGE PAYOFF PAYOFFS PETTY CORRUPTION PHILOSOPHY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS PRIVATE GAIN PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLISHING PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REFLECTION REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL HISTORY SOCIAL NORMS SOCIALIZATION TRADITION TRANSPARENCY TRUSTWORTHINESS VILLAGES Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures. 2012-06-29T22:09:13Z 2012-06-29T22:09:13Z 2012-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16259932/experiments-culture-corruption-review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9355 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6064 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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World Bank |
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English |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES ANTICORRUPTION POLICY AUDITING BASIC BELIEFS BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBE PAYERS INDEX BRIBERY BRIBES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CORRUPTION RESEARCH CPI CPI RANKING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES CULTURAL FACTORS CULTURAL STUDIES CULTURES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION EMBEZZLEMENT ETHICS ETHNIC GROUPS EXTORTION FIGURES FREE PRESS GAMES GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM LAWS LITERATURE MAFIA MORALS NEPOTISM OPENNESS PATRONAGE PAYOFF PAYOFFS PETTY CORRUPTION PHILOSOPHY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS PRIVATE GAIN PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLISHING PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REFLECTION REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL HISTORY SOCIAL NORMS SOCIALIZATION TRADITION TRANSPARENCY TRUSTWORTHINESS VILLAGES |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES ANTICORRUPTION POLICY AUDITING BASIC BELIEFS BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBE PAYERS INDEX BRIBERY BRIBES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CORRUPTION RESEARCH CPI CPI RANKING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES CULTURAL FACTORS CULTURAL STUDIES CULTURES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION EMBEZZLEMENT ETHICS ETHNIC GROUPS EXTORTION FIGURES FREE PRESS GAMES GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INFERENCE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM LAWS LITERATURE MAFIA MORALS NEPOTISM OPENNESS PATRONAGE PAYOFF PAYOFFS PETTY CORRUPTION PHILOSOPHY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS PRIVATE GAIN PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLISHING PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REFLECTION REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL HISTORY SOCIAL NORMS SOCIALIZATION TRADITION TRANSPARENCY TRUSTWORTHINESS VILLAGES Banuri, Sheheryar Eckel, Catherine Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6064 |
description |
Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Banuri, Sheheryar Eckel, Catherine |
author_facet |
Banuri, Sheheryar Eckel, Catherine |
author_sort |
Banuri, Sheheryar |
title |
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
title_short |
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
title_full |
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
title_fullStr |
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
title_full_unstemmed |
Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review |
title_sort |
experiments in culture and corruption : a review |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16259932/experiments-culture-corruption-review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9355 |
_version_ |
1764409251303784448 |