Takeover Laws and Financial Development
The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a c...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7112008/takeover-laws-financial-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9003 |
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okr-10986-90032021-04-23T14:02:41Z Takeover Laws and Financial Development Nenova, Tatiana ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES ANTI-TAKEOVER TACTICS APPRAISAL RIGHT APPRAISAL RIGHTS ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION ASSET SALES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BIDDERS BONDS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CHARTER COMPANY COMPANY MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROL CONTROL TRANSACTIONS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DECISIONS CORPORATE DEFENSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE RAIDER CORPORATE REGULATIONS CORPORATE VALUE CORPORATION DEBT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY DIRECTOR LIABILITY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE RULES DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS DIVERSIFICATION DIVIDENDS EMERGING MARKETS EQUAL TREATMENT EQUITY CAPITAL EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FINANCING FAIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS GOING PRIVATE GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOLDEN SHARES HOSTILE BIDS HOSTILE TAKEOVERS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTMENT COMPANIES INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDER LIMITED MANAGERS MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET TRADING MARKET VALUE MARKETING MEMBER STATES MERGER MERGERS MINORITY INTERESTS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAC POISON PILL POISON PILLS PORTFOLIO POTENTIAL ACQUIRER PRIVATE COMPANY PROTECTION OF INVESTOR PROXY PUBLIC COMPANIES PUBLIC COMPANY PURCHASING PYRAMID OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK EXPOSURE SALE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES REGULATOR SHARE OWNERSHIP SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDING STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES TAKEOVER TAKEOVER BID TAKEOVER LAW TAKEOVER LAWS TAKEOVER LEGISLATION TAKEOVER MECHANISMS TAKEOVER REGULATION TAKEOVER REGULATIONS TAKEOVER THREAT TAKEOVERS TARGET BOARD TARGET COMPANY TARGET SHAREHOLDERS TENDER OFFER TENDER OFFERS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSPARENCY VALUATION VENTURE CAPITAL VENTURE CAPITAL FIRM VOTING SHARES WEALTH The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development. 2012-06-26T14:05:01Z 2012-06-26T14:05:01Z 2006-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7112008/takeover-laws-financial-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9003 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4029 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES ANTI-TAKEOVER TACTICS APPRAISAL RIGHT APPRAISAL RIGHTS ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION ASSET SALES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BIDDERS BONDS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CHARTER COMPANY COMPANY MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROL CONTROL TRANSACTIONS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DECISIONS CORPORATE DEFENSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE RAIDER CORPORATE REGULATIONS CORPORATE VALUE CORPORATION DEBT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY DIRECTOR LIABILITY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE RULES DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS DIVERSIFICATION DIVIDENDS EMERGING MARKETS EQUAL TREATMENT EQUITY CAPITAL EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FINANCING FAIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS GOING PRIVATE GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOLDEN SHARES HOSTILE BIDS HOSTILE TAKEOVERS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTMENT COMPANIES INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDER LIMITED MANAGERS MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET TRADING MARKET VALUE MARKETING MEMBER STATES MERGER MERGERS MINORITY INTERESTS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAC POISON PILL POISON PILLS PORTFOLIO POTENTIAL ACQUIRER PRIVATE COMPANY PROTECTION OF INVESTOR PROXY PUBLIC COMPANIES PUBLIC COMPANY PURCHASING PYRAMID OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK EXPOSURE SALE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES REGULATOR SHARE OWNERSHIP SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDING STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES TAKEOVER TAKEOVER BID TAKEOVER LAW TAKEOVER LAWS TAKEOVER LEGISLATION TAKEOVER MECHANISMS TAKEOVER REGULATION TAKEOVER REGULATIONS TAKEOVER THREAT TAKEOVERS TARGET BOARD TARGET COMPANY TARGET SHAREHOLDERS TENDER OFFER TENDER OFFERS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSPARENCY VALUATION VENTURE CAPITAL VENTURE CAPITAL FIRM VOTING SHARES WEALTH |
spellingShingle |
ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES ANTI-TAKEOVER TACTICS APPRAISAL RIGHT APPRAISAL RIGHTS ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION ASSET SALES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BIDDERS BONDS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CHARTER COMPANY COMPANY MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROL CONTROL TRANSACTIONS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DECISIONS CORPORATE DEFENSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE RAIDER CORPORATE REGULATIONS CORPORATE VALUE CORPORATION DEBT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY DIRECTOR LIABILITY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE RULES DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS DIVERSIFICATION DIVIDENDS EMERGING MARKETS EQUAL TREATMENT EQUITY CAPITAL EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FINANCING FAIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS GOING PRIVATE GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOLDEN SHARES HOSTILE BIDS HOSTILE TAKEOVERS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTMENT COMPANIES INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDER LIMITED MANAGERS MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET TRADING MARKET VALUE MARKETING MEMBER STATES MERGER MERGERS MINORITY INTERESTS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAC POISON PILL POISON PILLS PORTFOLIO POTENTIAL ACQUIRER PRIVATE COMPANY PROTECTION OF INVESTOR PROXY PUBLIC COMPANIES PUBLIC COMPANY PURCHASING PYRAMID OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK EXPOSURE SALE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES REGULATOR SHARE OWNERSHIP SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDING STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS SUBSIDIARIES TAKEOVER TAKEOVER BID TAKEOVER LAW TAKEOVER LAWS TAKEOVER LEGISLATION TAKEOVER MECHANISMS TAKEOVER REGULATION TAKEOVER REGULATIONS TAKEOVER THREAT TAKEOVERS TARGET BOARD TARGET COMPANY TARGET SHAREHOLDERS TENDER OFFER TENDER OFFERS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSPARENCY VALUATION VENTURE CAPITAL VENTURE CAPITAL FIRM VOTING SHARES WEALTH Nenova, Tatiana Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4029 |
description |
The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Nenova, Tatiana |
author_facet |
Nenova, Tatiana |
author_sort |
Nenova, Tatiana |
title |
Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
title_short |
Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
title_full |
Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
title_fullStr |
Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
title_full_unstemmed |
Takeover Laws and Financial Development |
title_sort |
takeover laws and financial development |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7112008/takeover-laws-financial-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9003 |
_version_ |
1764406462678827008 |