Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political acco...

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Main Authors:	Gasmi, Farid, Noumba Um, Paul, Virto, Laura Recuero
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY VARIABLES ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY AUTOCORRELATION BUREAUCRACY CAUSATION CITIZENS COEFFICIENTS COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS CURRENCY RISK DATA ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DYNAMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTRICITY SECTOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ERROR ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINITE SAMPLE FIXED EFFECTS GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNANCE GOODNESS-OF-FIT GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES GRANGER-CAUSE GRANGER-CAUSES GROWTH PERFORMANCE HUMAN CAPITAL HYPOTHESES INDEPENDENT REGULATOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES JUDICIARY LAG LENGTH LATIN AMERICAN LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MARKET ECONOMIES MEASUREMENT ERRORS MOMENT CONDITIONS 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OUTLIERS PANEL DATA PERFORMANCE TARGETS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STRUCTURES POLITICIANS PRECISION PREDICTABILITY PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY PROCEDURES REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY STRUCTURES REPRESENTATIVES SET OF VARIABLES SOCIAL WELFARE STANDARD ERRORS STOCHASTIC PROCESS TELEPHONE SERVICE TIME PERIOD TIME TREND TIME-SERIES TRANSPARENCY UNIT ROOT VALIDITY VETO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7296583/political-accountability-regulatory-performance-infrastructure-industries-empirical-analysis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8943

id	okr-10986-8943
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-89432021-04-23T14:02:42Z Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis Gasmi, Farid Noumba Um, Paul Virto, Laura Recuero ACCOUNTABILITY VARIABLES ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY AUTOCORRELATION BUREAUCRACY CAUSATION CITIZENS COEFFICIENTS COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS CURRENCY RISK DATA ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DYNAMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTRICITY SECTOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ERROR ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINITE SAMPLE FIXED EFFECTS GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNANCE GOODNESS-OF-FIT GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES GRANGER-CAUSE GRANGER-CAUSES GROWTH PERFORMANCE HUMAN CAPITAL HYPOTHESES INDEPENDENT REGULATOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES JUDICIARY LAG LENGTH LATIN AMERICAN LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MARKET ECONOMIES MEASUREMENT ERRORS MOMENT CONDITIONS 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OUTLIERS PANEL DATA PERFORMANCE TARGETS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STRUCTURES POLITICIANS PRECISION PREDICTABILITY PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY PROCEDURES REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY STRUCTURES REPRESENTATIVES SET OF VARIABLES SOCIAL WELFARE STANDARD ERRORS STOCHASTIC PROCESS TELEPHONE SERVICE TIME PERIOD TIME TREND TIME-SERIES TRANSPARENCY UNIT ROOT VALIDITY VETO The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems. 2012-06-25T16:02:53Z 2012-06-25T16:02:53Z 2006-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7296583/political-accountability-regulatory-performance-infrastructure-industries-empirical-analysis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8943 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4101 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ACCOUNTABILITY VARIABLES ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY AUTOCORRELATION BUREAUCRACY CAUSATION CITIZENS COEFFICIENTS COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS CURRENCY RISK DATA ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DYNAMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTRICITY SECTOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ERROR ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINITE SAMPLE FIXED EFFECTS GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNANCE GOODNESS-OF-FIT GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES GRANGER-CAUSE GRANGER-CAUSES GROWTH PERFORMANCE HUMAN CAPITAL HYPOTHESES INDEPENDENT REGULATOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES JUDICIARY LAG LENGTH LATIN AMERICAN LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MARKET ECONOMIES MEASUREMENT ERRORS MOMENT CONDITIONS 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OUTLIERS PANEL DATA PERFORMANCE TARGETS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STRUCTURES POLITICIANS PRECISION PREDICTABILITY PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY PROCEDURES REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY STRUCTURES REPRESENTATIVES SET OF VARIABLES SOCIAL WELFARE STANDARD ERRORS STOCHASTIC PROCESS TELEPHONE SERVICE TIME PERIOD TIME TREND TIME-SERIES TRANSPARENCY UNIT ROOT VALIDITY VETO
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTABILITY VARIABLES ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY AUTOCORRELATION BUREAUCRACY CAUSATION CITIZENS COEFFICIENTS COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS CURRENCY RISK DATA ANALYSIS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DYNAMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTRICITY SECTOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ERROR ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINITE SAMPLE FIXED EFFECTS GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNANCE GOODNESS-OF-FIT GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES GRANGER-CAUSE GRANGER-CAUSES GROWTH PERFORMANCE HUMAN CAPITAL HYPOTHESES INDEPENDENT REGULATOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES JUDICIARY LAG LENGTH LATIN AMERICAN LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MARKET ECONOMIES MEASUREMENT ERRORS MOMENT CONDITIONS 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OUTLIERS PANEL DATA PERFORMANCE TARGETS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL STRUCTURES POLITICIANS PRECISION PREDICTABILITY PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INCENTIVES REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE REGULATORY POLICIES REGULATORY PROCEDURES REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY STRUCTURES REPRESENTATIVES SET OF VARIABLES SOCIAL WELFARE STANDARD ERRORS STOCHASTIC PROCESS TELEPHONE SERVICE TIME PERIOD TIME TREND TIME-SERIES TRANSPARENCY UNIT ROOT VALIDITY VETO Gasmi, Farid Noumba Um, Paul Virto, Laura Recuero Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4101
description	The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Gasmi, Farid Noumba Um, Paul Virto, Laura Recuero
author_facet	Gasmi, Farid Noumba Um, Paul Virto, Laura Recuero
author_sort	Gasmi, Farid
title	Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
title_short	Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
title_full	Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
title_fullStr	Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
title_full_unstemmed	Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis
title_sort	political accountability and regulatory performance in infrastructure industries: an empirical analysis
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7296583/political-accountability-regulatory-performance-infrastructure-industries-empirical-analysis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8943
_version_	1764406843832008704

Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis

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