Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?

This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. On...

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Main Author:	Keefer, Philip
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	AUTOCRACY BANKS BONDS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL AMERICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISECONOMIES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES EDUCATION OUTCOMES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GDP GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROTECTION GOVERNMENT SPENDING HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME PARTY RANKS PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS POSITIVE EFFECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT/GDP PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING SUFFRAGE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE VOTERS VOTING WAGES/GDP WEALTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/5800538/democratization-clientelism-young-democracies-badly-governed http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8940

id	okr-10986-8940
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spelling	okr-10986-89402021-04-23T14:02:42Z Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed? Keefer, Philip AUTOCRACY BANKS BONDS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL AMERICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISECONOMIES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES EDUCATION OUTCOMES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GDP GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROTECTION GOVERNMENT SPENDING HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME PARTY RANKS PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS POSITIVE EFFECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT/GDP PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING SUFFRAGE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE VOTERS VOTING WAGES/GDP WEALTH This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies. 2012-06-25T15:52:48Z 2012-06-25T15:52:48Z 2005-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/5800538/democratization-clientelism-young-democracies-badly-governed http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8940 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3594 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	AUTOCRACY BANKS BONDS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL AMERICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISECONOMIES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES EDUCATION OUTCOMES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GDP GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROTECTION GOVERNMENT SPENDING HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME PARTY RANKS PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS POSITIVE EFFECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT/GDP PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING SUFFRAGE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE VOTERS VOTING WAGES/GDP WEALTH
spellingShingle	AUTOCRACY BANKS BONDS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL AMERICAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIME DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISECONOMIES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES EDUCATION OUTCOMES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GDP GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROTECTION GOVERNMENT SPENDING HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME PARTY RANKS PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS POSITIVE EFFECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT/GDP PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING SUFFRAGE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE VOTERS VOTING WAGES/GDP WEALTH Keefer, Philip Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3594
description	This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Keefer, Philip
author_facet	Keefer, Philip
author_sort	Keefer, Philip
title	Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
title_short	Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
title_full	Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
title_fullStr	Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
title_full_unstemmed	Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
title_sort	democratization and clientelism : why are young democracies badly governed?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/5800538/democratization-clientelism-young-democracies-badly-governed http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8940
_version_	1764407406668808192

Democratization and Clientelism : Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?

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