Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged?
Antidumping and related trade remedies are the most popular policy instruments that many of the largest importing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system use to restrict international trade. While such trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the W...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/5670954/trade-remedies-world-trade-organization-dispute-settlement-so-few-challenged http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8817 |
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okr-10986-88172021-04-23T14:02:42Z Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? Bown, Chad P. ACCOUNTING AGRICULTURE COLLUSION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DUMPING ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC MOTIVATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FUTURE RESEARCH GATT GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE HARMONIZED SYSTEM IMPORTS INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MANUFACTURING MARGINS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS PRODUCTIVITY REAL GDP RECIPROCITY SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHIPMENTS TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DISPUTES TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REMEDIES VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Antidumping and related trade remedies are the most popular policy instruments that many of the largest importing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system use to restrict international trade. While such trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the WTO, given that Panel and Appellate Body rulings have almost invariably found that some aspect of each reviewed remedy was inconsistent with WTO obligations, an open research question is why aren't more remedies targeted by dispute settlement? The author provides a first empirical investigation of the trade remedy and WTO dispute settlement interaction by focusing on determinants of WTO members' decisions of whether to formally challenge U.S. trade remedies imposed between 1992 and 2003. He provides evidence that it is not only the size of the economic market at stake and the capacity to retaliate under potential DSU (dispute settlement understanding)-authorized sanctions that influence the litigation decision of whether to formally challenge a measure at the WTO. The author also finds that if the negatively affected foreign industry has the capacity to directly retaliate through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and measure of its own, its government is less likely to pursue the case on its behalf at the WTO. This is consistent with the theory that potential complainants may be avoiding WTO litigation in favor of pursuing reciprocal antidumping and hence "vigilante justice." 2012-06-22T18:18:05Z 2012-06-22T18:18:05Z 2005-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/5670954/trade-remedies-world-trade-organization-dispute-settlement-so-few-challenged http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8817 English Policy Research Working Paper ; No. 3540 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING AGRICULTURE COLLUSION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DUMPING ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC MOTIVATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FUTURE RESEARCH GATT GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE HARMONIZED SYSTEM IMPORTS INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MANUFACTURING MARGINS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS PRODUCTIVITY REAL GDP RECIPROCITY SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHIPMENTS TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DISPUTES TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REMEDIES VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING AGRICULTURE COLLUSION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DUMPING ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC MOTIVATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FUTURE RESEARCH GATT GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE HARMONIZED SYSTEM IMPORTS INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MANUFACTURING MARGINS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS PRODUCTIVITY REAL GDP RECIPROCITY SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHIPMENTS TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DISPUTES TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE REMEDIES VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Bown, Chad P. Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper ; No. 3540 |
| description |
Antidumping and related trade remedies are the most popular policy instruments that many of the largest importing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system use to restrict international trade. While such trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the WTO, given that Panel and Appellate Body rulings have almost invariably found that some aspect of each reviewed remedy was inconsistent with WTO obligations, an open research question is why aren't more remedies targeted by dispute settlement? The author provides a first empirical investigation of the trade remedy and WTO dispute settlement interaction by focusing on determinants of WTO members' decisions of whether to formally challenge U.S. trade remedies imposed between 1992 and 2003. He provides evidence that it is not only the size of the economic market at stake and the capacity to retaliate under potential DSU (dispute settlement understanding)-authorized sanctions that influence the litigation decision of whether to formally challenge a measure at the WTO. The author also finds that if the negatively affected foreign industry has the capacity to directly retaliate through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and measure of its own, its government is less likely to pursue the case on its behalf at the WTO. This is consistent with the theory that potential complainants may be avoiding WTO litigation in favor of pursuing reciprocal antidumping and hence "vigilante justice." |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Bown, Chad P. |
| author_facet |
Bown, Chad P. |
| author_sort |
Bown, Chad P. |
| title |
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| title_short |
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| title_full |
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| title_fullStr |
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged? |
| title_sort |
trade remedies and world trade organization dispute settlement : why are so few challenged? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/5670954/trade-remedies-world-trade-organization-dispute-settlement-so-few-challenged http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8817 |
| _version_ |
1764406971971141632 |