Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?

The authors analyze recent efforts at international cooperation to limit illegal migration, particularly through the use of legal migration avenues like guest worker schemes. They show that while guest worker schemes may be desirable as an avenue of international migration, they are an inefficient i...

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Main Authors:	Amin, Mohammad, Mattoo, Aaditya
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	BORDER PATROL COMPENSATION CULTURES DISCRIMINATION DISPLACEMENT EMIGRATION EMIGRATION POLICIES FAMILIES HEALTH CARE ILLEGAL ALIENS ILLEGAL ENTRY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ILLEGAL MIGRATION IMMIGRATION IMMIGRATION POLICIES IMMIGRATION POLICY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IRREGULAR MIGRATION LABOR MARKET MIGRANT MIGRANT SMUGGLING MIGRATION POWER PUBLIC SERVICES SOCIAL COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VISAS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6553724/can-guest-worker-schemes-reduce-illegal-migration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8773

id	okr-10986-8773
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-87732021-04-23T14:02:40Z Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration? Amin, Mohammad Mattoo, Aaditya BORDER PATROL COMPENSATION CULTURES DISCRIMINATION DISPLACEMENT EMIGRATION EMIGRATION POLICIES FAMILIES HEALTH CARE ILLEGAL ALIENS ILLEGAL ENTRY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ILLEGAL MIGRATION IMMIGRATION IMMIGRATION POLICIES IMMIGRATION POLICY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IRREGULAR MIGRATION LABOR MARKET MIGRANT MIGRANT SMUGGLING MIGRATION POWER PUBLIC SERVICES SOCIAL COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VISAS The authors analyze recent efforts at international cooperation to limit illegal migration, particularly through the use of legal migration avenues like guest worker schemes. They show that while guest worker schemes may be desirable as an avenue of international migration, they are an inefficient instrument to induce cooperation on illegal migration. On the one hand, guest worker schemes suffer from a negative selection problem relative to illegal migration, which tends to erode their attractiveness to source countries. On the other hand, guest worker schemes increase total (legal and illegal) migration which make them a costly compensating device for the host country. Moreover, guest worker schemes create additional pressure on host countries to implement tough laws against illegal immigration even when the host finds such laws undesirable. Thus, less favorable treatment of illegal immigrants, as in California Proposition 187, may be an inevitable rather than incidental outcome of reliance on guest worker schemes. In contrast, countries that are willing to use transfers and other forms of economic assistance to induce source countries to cooperate can afford relatively liberal treatment of illegal immigrants. 2012-06-22T14:56:47Z 2012-06-22T14:56:47Z 2006-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6553724/can-guest-worker-schemes-reduce-illegal-migration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8773 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3828 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	BORDER PATROL COMPENSATION CULTURES DISCRIMINATION DISPLACEMENT EMIGRATION EMIGRATION POLICIES FAMILIES HEALTH CARE ILLEGAL ALIENS ILLEGAL ENTRY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ILLEGAL MIGRATION IMMIGRATION IMMIGRATION POLICIES IMMIGRATION POLICY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IRREGULAR MIGRATION LABOR MARKET MIGRANT MIGRANT SMUGGLING MIGRATION POWER PUBLIC SERVICES SOCIAL COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VISAS
spellingShingle	BORDER PATROL COMPENSATION CULTURES DISCRIMINATION DISPLACEMENT EMIGRATION EMIGRATION POLICIES FAMILIES HEALTH CARE ILLEGAL ALIENS ILLEGAL ENTRY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ILLEGAL MIGRATION IMMIGRATION IMMIGRATION POLICIES IMMIGRATION POLICY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IRREGULAR MIGRATION LABOR MARKET MIGRANT MIGRANT SMUGGLING MIGRATION POWER PUBLIC SERVICES SOCIAL COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VISAS Amin, Mohammad Mattoo, Aaditya Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3828
description	The authors analyze recent efforts at international cooperation to limit illegal migration, particularly through the use of legal migration avenues like guest worker schemes. They show that while guest worker schemes may be desirable as an avenue of international migration, they are an inefficient instrument to induce cooperation on illegal migration. On the one hand, guest worker schemes suffer from a negative selection problem relative to illegal migration, which tends to erode their attractiveness to source countries. On the other hand, guest worker schemes increase total (legal and illegal) migration which make them a costly compensating device for the host country. Moreover, guest worker schemes create additional pressure on host countries to implement tough laws against illegal immigration even when the host finds such laws undesirable. Thus, less favorable treatment of illegal immigrants, as in California Proposition 187, may be an inevitable rather than incidental outcome of reliance on guest worker schemes. In contrast, countries that are willing to use transfers and other forms of economic assistance to induce source countries to cooperate can afford relatively liberal treatment of illegal immigrants.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Amin, Mohammad Mattoo, Aaditya
author_facet	Amin, Mohammad Mattoo, Aaditya
author_sort	Amin, Mohammad
title	Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
title_short	Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
title_full	Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
title_fullStr	Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
title_full_unstemmed	Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?
title_sort	can guest worker schemes reduce illegal migration?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6553724/can-guest-worker-schemes-reduce-illegal-migration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8773
_version_	1764405763852206080

Can Guest Worker Schemes Reduce Illegal Migration?

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