Evaluating Recipes for Development Success

This paper provides a review of the contradictions and conflicts in the literature on economic governance and sketches an approach to use some of the conceptual and empirical findings from that literature for development policy. The literature offers conflicting conclusions on big questions: whether...

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Main Author:	Dixit, Avinash
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	AGRICULTURE AUTHORITARIAN RULE AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COLONIALISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COURTS CRISES CURRENT ACCOUNT CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTORAL RULES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS FINANCIAL MARKETS FIXED COSTS FOREIGN AID FORMAL CONTRACTS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FORMAL SYSTEM FREE MARKET PRICES GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOOD POLICIES GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GROWTH MODELS INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITIGATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL KNOWLEDGE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MASS MEDIA MEASUREMENT ERRORS MIDDLE EAST NATURAL RESOURCES ORGANIZED CRIME OUTPUT PER CAPITA PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLICY ACTIONS POLICY CHANGES POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL POWER PRICE SUBSIDIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE REGULATORY AGENCIES REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL NETWORKS STATE AUTHORITIES SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE WAR
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/03/6612725/evaluating-recipes-development-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8758

id	okr-10986-8758
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-87582021-04-23T14:02:40Z Evaluating Recipes for Development Success Dixit, Avinash AGRICULTURE AUTHORITARIAN RULE AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COLONIALISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COURTS CRISES CURRENT ACCOUNT CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTORAL RULES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS FINANCIAL MARKETS FIXED COSTS FOREIGN AID FORMAL CONTRACTS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FORMAL SYSTEM FREE MARKET PRICES GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOOD POLICIES GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GROWTH MODELS INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITIGATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL KNOWLEDGE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MASS MEDIA MEASUREMENT ERRORS MIDDLE EAST NATURAL RESOURCES ORGANIZED CRIME OUTPUT PER CAPITA PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLICY ACTIONS POLICY CHANGES POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL POWER PRICE SUBSIDIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE REGULATORY AGENCIES REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL NETWORKS STATE AUTHORITIES SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE WAR This paper provides a review of the contradictions and conflicts in the literature on economic governance and sketches an approach to use some of the conceptual and empirical findings from that literature for development policy. The literature offers conflicting conclusions on big questions: whether history and geography preordain a country's economic fate, whether democracy or authoritarianism promotes growth; whether informal or formal mechanisms are best; whether "big bang" or gradual transitions promote growth; and whether disasters and demographics are stumbling blocks or stepping stones. The author finds recipes for success that are infeasible, contradictory and shifting, and that ignore the role of luck in development policy. While the researcher may ask, "What creates success on average across countries?" the policymaker needs to know, "What is going wrong in this country and how can we put it right?" The author suggests a preliminary approach to combine the practitioner's detailed knowledge of country conditions with the broader patterns uncovered by scholars, building on "growth diagnostics" that identify binding constraints to development. But he shifts from the sequential "decision tree" framework to a more directly "diagnostic" approach that recognizes that policymakers must deal with many factors simultaneously. The framework he suggests combines empirical information on potential causes, estimates of their probabilities, and observed effects. He proposes this framework as the foundation, not for another recipe, but for a broader mode of thought to tackle the complexity and variance in development processes and patterns across countries and time-one country at a time. 2012-06-22T14:18:22Z 2012-06-22T14:18:22Z 2006-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/03/6612725/evaluating-recipes-development-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8758 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3859 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	AGRICULTURE AUTHORITARIAN RULE AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COLONIALISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COURTS CRISES CURRENT ACCOUNT CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTORAL RULES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS FINANCIAL MARKETS FIXED COSTS FOREIGN AID FORMAL CONTRACTS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FORMAL SYSTEM FREE MARKET PRICES GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOOD POLICIES GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GROWTH MODELS INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITIGATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL KNOWLEDGE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MASS MEDIA MEASUREMENT ERRORS MIDDLE EAST NATURAL RESOURCES ORGANIZED CRIME OUTPUT PER CAPITA PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLICY ACTIONS POLICY CHANGES POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL POWER PRICE SUBSIDIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE REGULATORY AGENCIES REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL NETWORKS STATE AUTHORITIES SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE WAR
spellingShingle	AGRICULTURE AUTHORITARIAN RULE AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COLONIALISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COURTS CRISES CURRENT ACCOUNT CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTORAL RULES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS FINANCIAL MARKETS FIXED COSTS FOREIGN AID FORMAL CONTRACTS FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FORMAL SYSTEM FREE MARKET PRICES GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOOD POLICIES GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GROWTH MODELS INCOME INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITIGATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL KNOWLEDGE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MASS MEDIA MEASUREMENT ERRORS MIDDLE EAST NATURAL RESOURCES ORGANIZED CRIME OUTPUT PER CAPITA PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLICY ACTIONS POLICY CHANGES POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL POWER PRICE SUBSIDIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE REGULATORY AGENCIES REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL NETWORKS STATE AUTHORITIES SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE WAR Dixit, Avinash Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3859
description	This paper provides a review of the contradictions and conflicts in the literature on economic governance and sketches an approach to use some of the conceptual and empirical findings from that literature for development policy. The literature offers conflicting conclusions on big questions: whether history and geography preordain a country's economic fate, whether democracy or authoritarianism promotes growth; whether informal or formal mechanisms are best; whether "big bang" or gradual transitions promote growth; and whether disasters and demographics are stumbling blocks or stepping stones. The author finds recipes for success that are infeasible, contradictory and shifting, and that ignore the role of luck in development policy. While the researcher may ask, "What creates success on average across countries?" the policymaker needs to know, "What is going wrong in this country and how can we put it right?" The author suggests a preliminary approach to combine the practitioner's detailed knowledge of country conditions with the broader patterns uncovered by scholars, building on "growth diagnostics" that identify binding constraints to development. But he shifts from the sequential "decision tree" framework to a more directly "diagnostic" approach that recognizes that policymakers must deal with many factors simultaneously. The framework he suggests combines empirical information on potential causes, estimates of their probabilities, and observed effects. He proposes this framework as the foundation, not for another recipe, but for a broader mode of thought to tackle the complexity and variance in development processes and patterns across countries and time-one country at a time.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Dixit, Avinash
author_facet	Dixit, Avinash
author_sort	Dixit, Avinash
title	Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
title_short	Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
title_full	Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
title_fullStr	Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
title_full_unstemmed	Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
title_sort	evaluating recipes for development success
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/03/6612725/evaluating-recipes-development-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8758
_version_	1764405961079914496

Evaluating Recipes for Development Success

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