Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization

While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of d...

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Main Authors:	Bahl, Roy, Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ALLIANCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY BUILDING BUREAUCRACY CALL CAPACITY CENTRAL MINISTRIES CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CONSTITUENCIES COUNCILS DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES DECENTRALIZATION POLICY DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIES DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL TRANSFERS LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES LOCAL REVENUE MOBILITY NATURAL RESOURCES PAPERS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES SERVICE DELIVERY SHOW HOW STATE GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TEACHER TRANSPARENCY UNDERLYING PROBLEM UNDERLYING PROBLEMS VOTERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/6770857/sequencing-fiscal-decentralization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8668

id	okr-10986-8668
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-86682021-04-23T14:02:40Z Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization Bahl, Roy Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ALLIANCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY BUILDING BUREAUCRACY CALL CAPACITY CENTRAL MINISTRIES CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CONSTITUENCIES COUNCILS DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES DECENTRALIZATION POLICY DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIES DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL TRANSFERS LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES LOCAL REVENUE MOBILITY NATURAL RESOURCES PAPERS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES SERVICE DELIVERY SHOW HOW STATE GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TEACHER TRANSPARENCY UNDERLYING PROBLEM UNDERLYING PROBLEMS VOTERS While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of decentralization, including the order of an introduction of decentralization policies, the number of years necessary to bring a full program on line, and the components of the transition strategy. The authors argue that the sequencing of decentralization policies is an important determinant of its success. The consequences of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from minor delays and complications to ineffectiveness and subsequent failing support of decentralization efforts, macroeconomic instability, and fundamental failure in public sector delivery. At a minimum, the strategy of "making it up as we go" will not lead to the same structure of decentralization as will a planned strategy. The paper raises two questions: First, is there an optimal sequencing for decentralization policies and implementation? The answer is that there is, and that following these sequencing rules can reduce the costs and risks of implementing fiscal decentralization. Second, to what extent do countries follow these optimal sequencing rules? The answer is, in general, they do not. The gap between theory and practice is a result of the complexity of sequencing design, which discourages fiscal planners from implementing the full process. In addition, sequencing requires a sustained discipline and vision for its implementation, as well as overcoming pressures from political actors, especially in developing countries. 2012-06-21T17:35:58Z 2012-06-21T17:35:58Z 2006-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/6770857/sequencing-fiscal-decentralization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8668 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3914 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ALLIANCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY BUILDING BUREAUCRACY CALL CAPACITY CENTRAL MINISTRIES CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CONSTITUENCIES COUNCILS DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES DECENTRALIZATION POLICY DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIES DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL TRANSFERS LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES LOCAL REVENUE MOBILITY NATURAL RESOURCES PAPERS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES SERVICE DELIVERY SHOW HOW STATE GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TEACHER TRANSPARENCY UNDERLYING PROBLEM UNDERLYING PROBLEMS VOTERS
spellingShingle	ALLIANCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY BUILDING BUREAUCRACY CALL CAPACITY CENTRAL MINISTRIES CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CONSTITUENCIES COUNCILS DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES DECENTRALIZATION POLICY DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIES DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL TRANSFERS LATIN AMERICAN LEARNING LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES LOCAL REVENUE MOBILITY NATURAL RESOURCES PAPERS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES SERVICE DELIVERY SHOW HOW STATE GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TEACHER TRANSPARENCY UNDERLYING PROBLEM UNDERLYING PROBLEMS VOTERS Bahl, Roy Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3914
description	While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of decentralization, including the order of an introduction of decentralization policies, the number of years necessary to bring a full program on line, and the components of the transition strategy. The authors argue that the sequencing of decentralization policies is an important determinant of its success. The consequences of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from minor delays and complications to ineffectiveness and subsequent failing support of decentralization efforts, macroeconomic instability, and fundamental failure in public sector delivery. At a minimum, the strategy of "making it up as we go" will not lead to the same structure of decentralization as will a planned strategy. The paper raises two questions: First, is there an optimal sequencing for decentralization policies and implementation? The answer is that there is, and that following these sequencing rules can reduce the costs and risks of implementing fiscal decentralization. Second, to what extent do countries follow these optimal sequencing rules? The answer is, in general, they do not. The gap between theory and practice is a result of the complexity of sequencing design, which discourages fiscal planners from implementing the full process. In addition, sequencing requires a sustained discipline and vision for its implementation, as well as overcoming pressures from political actors, especially in developing countries.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Bahl, Roy Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
author_facet	Bahl, Roy Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
author_sort	Bahl, Roy
title	Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
title_short	Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
title_full	Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
title_fullStr	Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
title_full_unstemmed	Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization
title_sort	sequencing fiscal decentralization
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/6770857/sequencing-fiscal-decentralization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8668
_version_	1764406091525914624

Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization

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