Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments

Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations wh...

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Main Authors:	Henisz, Witold J., Zelner, Bennet A.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ARISTOCRACY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPITALIST SYSTEMS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION CURRENCY CRISES DECOLONIZATION DEPRESSION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTIONS ELECTORAL RULES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EUROPEAN UNION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FINANCIAL SECTORS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL FOREIGN INVESTORS GOVERNMENT ACTION INNOVATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONALIZATION INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIARY KINGS LAWS LEARNING LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY LEGITIMATION MANAGERS MEDIA MEMBER STATES MONARCHY MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL POLICY NATIONALISM NATIONS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPPONENTS POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL ANALYSIS POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE SECTOR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY REFORM RESOURCE ALLOCATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIALIZATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION UNITED NATIONS VETO VETO POWER VICTIMS WORKERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246679/resistance-multilateral-influence-reform-political-backlash-against-private-infrastructure-investments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8605

id	okr-10986-8605
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spelling	okr-10986-86052021-04-23T14:02:43Z Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments Henisz, Witold J. Zelner, Bennet A. ARISTOCRACY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPITALIST SYSTEMS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION CURRENCY CRISES DECOLONIZATION DEPRESSION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTIONS ELECTORAL RULES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EUROPEAN UNION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FINANCIAL SECTORS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL FOREIGN INVESTORS GOVERNMENT ACTION INNOVATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONALIZATION INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIARY KINGS LAWS LEARNING LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY LEGITIMATION MANAGERS MEDIA MEMBER STATES MONARCHY MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL POLICY NATIONALISM NATIONS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPPONENTS POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL ANALYSIS POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE SECTOR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY REFORM RESOURCE ALLOCATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIALIZATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION UNITED NATIONS VETO VETO POWER VICTIMS WORKERS Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. 2012-06-20T22:06:43Z 2012-06-20T22:06:43Z 2005-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246679/resistance-multilateral-influence-reform-political-backlash-against-private-infrastructure-investments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8605 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3690 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ARISTOCRACY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPITALIST SYSTEMS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION CURRENCY CRISES DECOLONIZATION DEPRESSION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTIONS ELECTORAL RULES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EUROPEAN UNION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FINANCIAL SECTORS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL FOREIGN INVESTORS GOVERNMENT ACTION INNOVATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONALIZATION INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIARY KINGS LAWS LEARNING LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY LEGITIMATION MANAGERS MEDIA MEMBER STATES MONARCHY MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL POLICY NATIONALISM NATIONS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPPONENTS POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL ANALYSIS POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE SECTOR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY REFORM RESOURCE ALLOCATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIALIZATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION UNITED NATIONS VETO VETO POWER VICTIMS WORKERS
spellingShingle	ARISTOCRACY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPITALIST SYSTEMS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMMUNIST CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION CURRENCY CRISES DECOLONIZATION DEPRESSION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTIONS ELECTORAL RULES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EUROPEAN UNION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FINANCIAL SECTORS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL FOREIGN INVESTORS GOVERNMENT ACTION INNOVATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONALIZATION INTEREST GROUP INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIARY KINGS LAWS LEARNING LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY LEGITIMATION MANAGERS MEDIA MEMBER STATES MONARCHY MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL POLICY NATIONALISM NATIONS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPPONENTS POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL ANALYSIS POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE SECTOR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY REFORM RESOURCE ALLOCATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIALIZATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION UNITED NATIONS VETO VETO POWER VICTIMS WORKERS Henisz, Witold J. Zelner, Bennet A. Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3690
description	Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Henisz, Witold J. Zelner, Bennet A.
author_facet	Henisz, Witold J. Zelner, Bennet A.
author_sort	Henisz, Witold J.
title	Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
title_short	Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
title_full	Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
title_fullStr	Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
title_full_unstemmed	Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
title_sort	resistance to multilateral influence on reform : the political backlash against private infrastructure investments
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246679/resistance-multilateral-influence-reform-political-backlash-against-private-infrastructure-investments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8605
_version_	1764407720787574784

Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments

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