Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity
This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and deliv...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246687/managing-unilateral-market-power-electricity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8600 |
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okr-10986-86002021-04-23T14:02:43Z Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity Wolak, Frank A. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ANCILLARY SERVICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BIDDING COMMERCE COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVES DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SERVICES ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY NEED ENERGY PURCHASES EXTERNAL COSTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL VIABILITY GENERATION CAPACITY LATIN AMERICAN MARKET DESIGN MARKET MANAGEMENT MARKET OPERATOR MARKET PARTICIPANT MARKET PARTICIPANTS MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MARKET STRUCTURE PRICE CAPS PRICE RISK PRICE SET PRODUCT MARKETS REGULATORY POLICY RETAIL SECURITIES SERVICES MARKETS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKETS SPOT PRICE SPOT PRICES SUPPLIERS TACIT COLLUSION TRANSMISSION CAPACITY TRANSMISSION LINES TRANSMISSION NETWORK VOLATILITY WEALTH WHOLESALE PRICES This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market. 2012-06-20T21:52:20Z 2012-06-20T21:52:20Z 2005-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246687/managing-unilateral-market-power-electricity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8600 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3691 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ANCILLARY SERVICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BIDDING COMMERCE COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVES DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SERVICES ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY NEED ENERGY PURCHASES EXTERNAL COSTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL VIABILITY GENERATION CAPACITY LATIN AMERICAN MARKET DESIGN MARKET MANAGEMENT MARKET OPERATOR MARKET PARTICIPANT MARKET PARTICIPANTS MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MARKET STRUCTURE PRICE CAPS PRICE RISK PRICE SET PRODUCT MARKETS REGULATORY POLICY RETAIL SECURITIES SERVICES MARKETS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKETS SPOT PRICE SPOT PRICES SUPPLIERS TACIT COLLUSION TRANSMISSION CAPACITY TRANSMISSION LINES TRANSMISSION NETWORK VOLATILITY WEALTH WHOLESALE PRICES |
| spellingShingle |
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ANCILLARY SERVICES ANTITRUST LAW ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BIDDING COMMERCE COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVES DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SERVICES ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENERGY MARKETS ENERGY NEED ENERGY PURCHASES EXTERNAL COSTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL VIABILITY GENERATION CAPACITY LATIN AMERICAN MARKET DESIGN MARKET MANAGEMENT MARKET OPERATOR MARKET PARTICIPANT MARKET PARTICIPANTS MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MARKET STRUCTURE PRICE CAPS PRICE RISK PRICE SET PRODUCT MARKETS REGULATORY POLICY RETAIL SECURITIES SERVICES MARKETS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKETS SPOT PRICE SPOT PRICES SUPPLIERS TACIT COLLUSION TRANSMISSION CAPACITY TRANSMISSION LINES TRANSMISSION NETWORK VOLATILITY WEALTH WHOLESALE PRICES Wolak, Frank A. Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3691 |
| description |
This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Wolak, Frank A. |
| author_facet |
Wolak, Frank A. |
| author_sort |
Wolak, Frank A. |
| title |
Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| title_short |
Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| title_full |
Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| title_fullStr |
Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity |
| title_sort |
managing unilateral market power in electricity |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6246687/managing-unilateral-market-power-electricity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8600 |
| _version_ |
1764407702226731008 |