The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization
How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? The authors investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/12/6442799/creation-rule-law-legitimacy-property-rights-political-economic-consequences-corrupt-privatization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8581 |
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okr-10986-85812021-04-23T14:02:43Z The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization Hoff, Karla Stiglitz, Joseph E. ADVERSE EFFECTS AGENCY PROBLEMS AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ASSETS CAPITAL FLIGHT CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CREDIT RATIONING DEMOCRACY DISCOUNTED VALUE EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED RETURN EXPECTED RETURNS EXTERNALITIES GNP GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GROWTH PATH INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE JUSTICE LAW INDICATOR LAWS MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MONETARY POLICY NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGARCHY PAYOFFS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD RULE OF LAW STEALING TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSITION ECONOMY WEALTH WEALTH CREATION How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? The authors investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime toward rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. They show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers. 2012-06-20T20:30:59Z 2012-06-20T20:30:59Z 2005-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/12/6442799/creation-rule-law-legitimacy-property-rights-political-economic-consequences-corrupt-privatization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8581 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3779 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ADVERSE EFFECTS AGENCY PROBLEMS AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ASSETS CAPITAL FLIGHT CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CREDIT RATIONING DEMOCRACY DISCOUNTED VALUE EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED RETURN EXPECTED RETURNS EXTERNALITIES GNP GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GROWTH PATH INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE JUSTICE LAW INDICATOR LAWS MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MONETARY POLICY NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGARCHY PAYOFFS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD RULE OF LAW STEALING TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSITION ECONOMY WEALTH WEALTH CREATION |
| spellingShingle |
ADVERSE EFFECTS AGENCY PROBLEMS AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ASSETS CAPITAL FLIGHT CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CREDIT RATIONING DEMOCRACY DISCOUNTED VALUE EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED RETURN EXPECTED RETURNS EXTERNALITIES GNP GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GROWTH PATH INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE JUSTICE LAW INDICATOR LAWS MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MONETARY POLICY NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGARCHY PAYOFFS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD RULE OF LAW STEALING TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSITION ECONOMY WEALTH WEALTH CREATION Hoff, Karla Stiglitz, Joseph E. The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3779 |
| description |
How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? The authors investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime toward rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. They show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Hoff, Karla Stiglitz, Joseph E. |
| author_facet |
Hoff, Karla Stiglitz, Joseph E. |
| author_sort |
Hoff, Karla |
| title |
The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| title_short |
The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| title_full |
The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| title_fullStr |
The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights : The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization |
| title_sort |
creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights : the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/12/6442799/creation-rule-law-legitimacy-property-rights-political-economic-consequences-corrupt-privatization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8581 |
| _version_ |
1764408043547656192 |