The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries

This paper uses a new dataset, "WATSAN," of private sector participation (PSP) projects for water and sanitation in developing countries to examine the determinants of the number of projects signed for each country between 1990 and 2004. The new dataset improves on existing sources, in par...

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Main Authors: Jensen, Olivia, Blanc-Brude, Frédéric
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
BOT
ROE
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6830370/handshake-governments-firms-sign-private-sector-participation-deals-evidence-water-sanitation-sector-developing-countries
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8432
id okr-10986-8432
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-84322021-04-23T14:02:41Z The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries Jensen, Olivia Blanc-Brude, Frédéric ABILITY-TO-PAY BOOT BOT CAP REGULATION CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL INVESTMENT CAPITAL INVESTMENTS COMPANY COMPETITIVE BIDDING CONCESSION CONTRACTS CONTRACT AWARD CONTRACT ENFORCEABILITY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATIONS COST OF EQUITY DROUGHT ECONOMIC REGULATOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EXPROPRIATION FINANCIAL VIABILITY FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANIES FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS INCOME INDEPENDENT REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS INVESTMENT PROJECTS INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS LATIN AMERICAN LAW FIRMS LOCAL INVESTORS MAINTENANCE OF ASSETS MUNICIPAL LEVEL MUNICIPALITIES PERFORMANCE DATA PORTFOLIO POWER SECTORS PRIVATE COMPANIES PRIVATE FIRM PRIVATE FIRMS PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTMENTS PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PRIVATE PARTNER PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN WATER PRIVATE WATER PRIVATE WATER COMPANIES PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVISION OF WATER PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC UTILITY PUBLIC WATER PUBLIC WATER UTILITIES PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY REFORM REGULATORY REGIME REGULATORY RULES REGULATORY VARIABLES ROE SANITATION SANITATION SECTOR SANITATION SERVICES SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SEWERAGE SERVICES STATE ENTERPRISES STATEMENTS SUPPLIERS TAX REVENUES UTILITIES UTILITY SERVICE WATER COMPANIES WATER COVERAGE WATER MARKET WATER OPERATORS WATER PROJECTS WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SERVICE WATER SERVICE DELIVERY WATER SERVICES WATER SUPPLY WATER UTILITIES WATER UTILITY This paper uses a new dataset, "WATSAN," of private sector participation (PSP) projects for water and sanitation in developing countries to examine the determinants of the number of projects signed for each country between 1990 and 2004. The new dataset improves on existing sources, in particular in its coverage of projects with local investors, and provides adequate data for cross-country regression analysis. The authors use a negative binomial regression model to investigate the factors influencing the number of PSP projects in a sample of 60 developing countries with 460 PSP projects. The regression results provide support for the hypotheses that PSP is greater in larger markets where the ability to pay is higher and where governments are fiscally constrained. The authors test several indicators of institutional quality and find that these are generally significant in determining the number of projects signed for each country. Measures of the protection of property rights and the quality of the bureaucracy emerge as the most important institutions that encourage PSP. Rule of law and the control of corruption are significant, albeit at a lower level, while the quality of contract law and political stability are not robustly significant. 2012-06-19T16:46:26Z 2012-06-19T16:46:26Z 2006-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6830370/handshake-governments-firms-sign-private-sector-participation-deals-evidence-water-sanitation-sector-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8432 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3937 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ABILITY-TO-PAY
BOOT
BOT
CAP REGULATION
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
COMPANY
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CONCESSION CONTRACTS
CONTRACT AWARD
CONTRACT ENFORCEABILITY
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CORPORATIONS
COST OF EQUITY
DROUGHT
ECONOMIC REGULATOR
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EXPROPRIATION
FINANCIAL VIABILITY
FIRMS
FOREIGN COMPANIES
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FOREIGN INVESTORS
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
INCOME
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS
INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS
LATIN AMERICAN
LAW FIRMS
LOCAL INVESTORS
MAINTENANCE OF ASSETS
MUNICIPAL LEVEL
MUNICIPALITIES
PERFORMANCE DATA
PORTFOLIO
POWER SECTORS
PRIVATE COMPANIES
PRIVATE FIRM
PRIVATE FIRMS
PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
PRIVATE INVESTORS
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
PRIVATE PARTNER
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN WATER
PRIVATE WATER
PRIVATE WATER COMPANIES
PRIVATIZATION
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROVISION OF WATER
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC UTILITY
PUBLIC WATER
PUBLIC WATER UTILITIES
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
REGULATORY AGENCY
REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
REGULATORY REFORM
REGULATORY REGIME
REGULATORY RULES
REGULATORY VARIABLES
ROE
SANITATION
SANITATION SECTOR
SANITATION SERVICES
SERVICE DELIVERY
SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS
SERVICE PROVISION
SERVICE QUALITY
SEWERAGE SERVICES
STATE ENTERPRISES
STATEMENTS
SUPPLIERS
TAX REVENUES
UTILITIES
UTILITY SERVICE
WATER COMPANIES
WATER COVERAGE
WATER MARKET
WATER OPERATORS
WATER PROJECTS
WATER SECTOR
WATER SECTOR REFORM
WATER SERVICE
WATER SERVICE DELIVERY
WATER SERVICES
WATER SUPPLY
WATER UTILITIES
WATER UTILITY
spellingShingle ABILITY-TO-PAY
BOOT
BOT
CAP REGULATION
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
COMPANY
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CONCESSION CONTRACTS
CONTRACT AWARD
CONTRACT ENFORCEABILITY
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CORPORATIONS
COST OF EQUITY
DROUGHT
ECONOMIC REGULATOR
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EXPROPRIATION
FINANCIAL VIABILITY
FIRMS
FOREIGN COMPANIES
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FOREIGN INVESTORS
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
INCOME
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS
INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS
LATIN AMERICAN
LAW FIRMS
LOCAL INVESTORS
MAINTENANCE OF ASSETS
MUNICIPAL LEVEL
MUNICIPALITIES
PERFORMANCE DATA
PORTFOLIO
POWER SECTORS
PRIVATE COMPANIES
PRIVATE FIRM
PRIVATE FIRMS
PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
PRIVATE INVESTORS
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
PRIVATE PARTNER
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN WATER
PRIVATE WATER
PRIVATE WATER COMPANIES
PRIVATIZATION
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROVISION OF WATER
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC UTILITY
PUBLIC WATER
PUBLIC WATER UTILITIES
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
REGULATORY AGENCY
REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
REGULATORY REFORM
REGULATORY REGIME
REGULATORY RULES
REGULATORY VARIABLES
ROE
SANITATION
SANITATION SECTOR
SANITATION SERVICES
SERVICE DELIVERY
SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS
SERVICE PROVISION
SERVICE QUALITY
SEWERAGE SERVICES
STATE ENTERPRISES
STATEMENTS
SUPPLIERS
TAX REVENUES
UTILITIES
UTILITY SERVICE
WATER COMPANIES
WATER COVERAGE
WATER MARKET
WATER OPERATORS
WATER PROJECTS
WATER SECTOR
WATER SECTOR REFORM
WATER SERVICE
WATER SERVICE DELIVERY
WATER SERVICES
WATER SUPPLY
WATER UTILITIES
WATER UTILITY
Jensen, Olivia
Blanc-Brude, Frédéric
The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3937
description This paper uses a new dataset, "WATSAN," of private sector participation (PSP) projects for water and sanitation in developing countries to examine the determinants of the number of projects signed for each country between 1990 and 2004. The new dataset improves on existing sources, in particular in its coverage of projects with local investors, and provides adequate data for cross-country regression analysis. The authors use a negative binomial regression model to investigate the factors influencing the number of PSP projects in a sample of 60 developing countries with 460 PSP projects. The regression results provide support for the hypotheses that PSP is greater in larger markets where the ability to pay is higher and where governments are fiscally constrained. The authors test several indicators of institutional quality and find that these are generally significant in determining the number of projects signed for each country. Measures of the protection of property rights and the quality of the bureaucracy emerge as the most important institutions that encourage PSP. Rule of law and the control of corruption are significant, albeit at a lower level, while the quality of contract law and political stability are not robustly significant.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Jensen, Olivia
Blanc-Brude, Frédéric
author_facet Jensen, Olivia
Blanc-Brude, Frédéric
author_sort Jensen, Olivia
title The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
title_short The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
title_full The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
title_fullStr The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
title_full_unstemmed The Handshake : Why Do Governments and Firms Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing Countries
title_sort handshake : why do governments and firms sign private sector participation deals? evidence from the water and sanitation sector in developing countries
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6830370/handshake-governments-firms-sign-private-sector-participation-deals-evidence-water-sanitation-sector-developing-countries
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8432
_version_ 1764406268020129792