What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290 |
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okr-10986-82902021-04-23T14:02:43Z What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BUDGET REVENUES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL CITIES COMPETITIVENESS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING DEFLATORS DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISTRICTS ECONOMIC SIZE ELASTICITY ELECTORAL COMPETITION EQUALIZATION EXHIBITS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FISCAL FISCAL CENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL REVENUE GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT LEVELS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GOVERNMENT SPENDING HEAD OF STATE INCOME INFLATION INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL DECISION MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MIGRATION MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATIZATION PURCHASING POWER REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGIONAL GOVERNMENT REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPUBLICS REVENUE MEASURES REVENUE SHARING SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOVEREIGNTY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS SUBNATIONAL FINANCE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WATER SUPPLY WEALTH The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level. 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z 2005-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3710 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation |
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Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BUDGET REVENUES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL CITIES COMPETITIVENESS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING DEFLATORS DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISTRICTS ECONOMIC SIZE ELASTICITY ELECTORAL COMPETITION EQUALIZATION EXHIBITS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FISCAL FISCAL CENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL REVENUE GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT LEVELS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GOVERNMENT SPENDING HEAD OF STATE INCOME INFLATION INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL DECISION MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MIGRATION MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATIZATION PURCHASING POWER REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGIONAL GOVERNMENT REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPUBLICS REVENUE MEASURES REVENUE SHARING SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOVEREIGNTY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS SUBNATIONAL FINANCE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WATER SUPPLY WEALTH |
spellingShingle |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BUDGET REVENUES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL CITIES COMPETITIVENESS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING DEFLATORS DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISTRICTS ECONOMIC SIZE ELASTICITY ELECTORAL COMPETITION EQUALIZATION EXHIBITS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FISCAL FISCAL CENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL REVENUE GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT LEVELS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GOVERNMENT SPENDING HEAD OF STATE INCOME INFLATION INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL DECISION MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MIGRATION MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATIZATION PURCHASING POWER REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGIONAL GOVERNMENT REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPUBLICS REVENUE MEASURES REVENUE SHARING SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOVEREIGNTY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS SUBNATIONAL FINANCE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WATER SUPPLY WEALTH Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3710 |
description |
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander |
author_facet |
Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander |
author_sort |
Freinkman, Lev |
title |
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
title_short |
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
title_full |
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
title_fullStr |
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
title_full_unstemmed |
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox |
title_sort |
what determines the extent of fiscal decentralization? the russian paradox |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290 |
_version_ |
1764407759105687552 |