What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox

The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of...

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Main Authors: Freinkman, Lev, Plekhanov, Alexander
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290
id okr-10986-8290
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-82902021-04-23T14:02:43Z What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BUDGET REVENUES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL CITIES COMPETITIVENESS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING DEFLATORS DEGREE OF CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISTRICTS ECONOMIC SIZE ELASTICITY ELECTORAL COMPETITION EQUALIZATION EXHIBITS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FISCAL FISCAL CENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL REVENUE GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT LEVELS GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT REVENUES GOVERNMENT SPENDING HEAD OF STATE INCOME INFLATION INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL DECISION MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MIGRATION MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES PENSIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATIZATION PURCHASING POWER REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION REGIONAL GOVERNMENT REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPUBLICS REVENUE MEASURES REVENUE SHARING SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOVEREIGNTY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS SUBNATIONAL FINANCE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WATER SUPPLY WEALTH The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level. 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z 2012-06-18T17:01:08Z 2005-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3710 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AUTONOMY
BUDGET REVENUES
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL
CITIES
COMPETITIVENESS
CONSENSUS
CORRUPTION
DECISION-MAKING
DEFLATORS
DEGREE OF CORRUPTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIZATION
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC SIZE
ELASTICITY
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
EQUALIZATION
EXHIBITS
EXPENDITURE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM
FEDERATIONS
FISCAL
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FISCAL POLICIES
FISCAL REVENUE
GDP
GINI COEFFICIENT
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
GOVERNMENT LEVELS
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
HEAD OF STATE
INCOME
INFLATION
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
LATIN AMERICAN
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LOCAL DECISION MAKING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MIGRATION
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPALITIES
PENSIONS
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATIZATION
PURCHASING POWER
REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
REPUBLICS
REVENUE MEASURES
REVENUE SHARING
SOCIAL TRANSFERS
SOVEREIGNTY
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE
SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS
SUBNATIONAL FINANCE
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
TAX COLLECTION
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
URBANIZATION
VOTERS
WATER SUPPLY
WEALTH
spellingShingle ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AUTONOMY
BUDGET REVENUES
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL
CITIES
COMPETITIVENESS
CONSENSUS
CORRUPTION
DECISION-MAKING
DEFLATORS
DEGREE OF CORRUPTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIZATION
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC SIZE
ELASTICITY
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
EQUALIZATION
EXHIBITS
EXPENDITURE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM
FEDERATIONS
FISCAL
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FISCAL POLICIES
FISCAL REVENUE
GDP
GINI COEFFICIENT
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
GOVERNMENT LEVELS
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
HEAD OF STATE
INCOME
INFLATION
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
LATIN AMERICAN
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LOCAL DECISION MAKING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MIGRATION
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPALITIES
PENSIONS
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POSITIVE EFFECTS
PRIVATIZATION
PURCHASING POWER
REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
REPUBLICS
REVENUE MEASURES
REVENUE SHARING
SOCIAL TRANSFERS
SOVEREIGNTY
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE
SUBNATIONAL BUDGETS
SUBNATIONAL FINANCE
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
TAX COLLECTION
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
URBANIZATION
VOTERS
WATER SUPPLY
WEALTH
Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
geographic_facet Europe and Central Asia
Russian Federation
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3710
description The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
author_facet Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
author_sort Freinkman, Lev
title What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
title_short What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
title_full What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
title_fullStr What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
title_full_unstemmed What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox
title_sort what determines the extent of fiscal decentralization? the russian paradox
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6271190/determines-extent-fiscal-decentralization-russian-paradox
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8290
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