Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India

The quality of medical care received by patients varies for two reasons: differences in doctors' competence or differences in doctors' incentives. Using medical vignettes, the authors evaluated competence for a sample of doctors in Delhi. One month later, they observed the same doctors in...

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Main Authors: Das, Jishnu, Hammer, Jeffrey
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6078943/money-nothing-dire-straits-medical-practice-delhi-india
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8196
id okr-10986-8196
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-81962021-04-23T14:02:43Z Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India Das, Jishnu Hammer, Jeffrey ADVERTISING ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE CAPITATION CLINICS COMPETENCE DISCRIMINATION DISPENSARIES DOCTORS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES FAMILIES GENDER HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE SERVICES HEALTH CLINICS HEALTH FOR ALL HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH SYSTEM HOSPITALS ILLNESSES INCOME INTUITION MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SERVICES MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD PATIENT CARE PATIENTS PHARMACY PHYSICIANS PLAYING POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RECOGNITION SANCTIONS SURGERY URBAN CENTERS WALKING The quality of medical care received by patients varies for two reasons: differences in doctors' competence or differences in doctors' incentives. Using medical vignettes, the authors evaluated competence for a sample of doctors in Delhi. One month later, they observed the same doctors in their practice. The authors find three patterns in the data. First, what doctors do is less than what they know they should do-doctors operate well inside their knowledge frontier. Second, competence and effort are complementary so that doctors who know more also do more. Third, the gap between what doctors do and what they know responds to incentives: doctors in the fee-for-service private sector are closer in practice to their knowledge frontier than those in the fixed-salary public sector. Under-qualified private sector doctors, even though they know less, provide better care on average than their better-qualified counterparts in the public sector. These results indicate that to improve medical services, at least for poor people, there should be greater emphasis on changing the incentives of public providers rather than increasing provider competence through training. 2012-06-15T19:59:58Z 2012-06-15T19:59:58Z 2005-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6078943/money-nothing-dire-straits-medical-practice-delhi-india http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8196 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3669 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia India
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ADVERTISING
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE
CAPITATION
CLINICS
COMPETENCE
DISCRIMINATION
DISPENSARIES
DOCTORS
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPENDITURES
FAMILIES
GENDER
HEALTH CARE
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
HEALTH CLINICS
HEALTH FOR ALL
HEALTH OUTCOMES
HEALTH SYSTEM
HOSPITALS
ILLNESSES
INCOME
INTUITION
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL INSURANCE
MEDICAL SERVICES
MEDICINES
MORAL HAZARD
PATIENT CARE
PATIENTS
PHARMACY
PHYSICIANS
PLAYING
POLICY DISCUSSIONS
POLICY RESEARCH
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
PRIVATE SECTOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
RECOGNITION
SANCTIONS
SURGERY
URBAN CENTERS
WALKING
spellingShingle ADVERTISING
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE
CAPITATION
CLINICS
COMPETENCE
DISCRIMINATION
DISPENSARIES
DOCTORS
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPENDITURES
FAMILIES
GENDER
HEALTH CARE
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
HEALTH CLINICS
HEALTH FOR ALL
HEALTH OUTCOMES
HEALTH SYSTEM
HOSPITALS
ILLNESSES
INCOME
INTUITION
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL INSURANCE
MEDICAL SERVICES
MEDICINES
MORAL HAZARD
PATIENT CARE
PATIENTS
PHARMACY
PHYSICIANS
PLAYING
POLICY DISCUSSIONS
POLICY RESEARCH
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
PRIVATE SECTOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
RECOGNITION
SANCTIONS
SURGERY
URBAN CENTERS
WALKING
Das, Jishnu
Hammer, Jeffrey
Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
geographic_facet South Asia
India
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3669
description The quality of medical care received by patients varies for two reasons: differences in doctors' competence or differences in doctors' incentives. Using medical vignettes, the authors evaluated competence for a sample of doctors in Delhi. One month later, they observed the same doctors in their practice. The authors find three patterns in the data. First, what doctors do is less than what they know they should do-doctors operate well inside their knowledge frontier. Second, competence and effort are complementary so that doctors who know more also do more. Third, the gap between what doctors do and what they know responds to incentives: doctors in the fee-for-service private sector are closer in practice to their knowledge frontier than those in the fixed-salary public sector. Under-qualified private sector doctors, even though they know less, provide better care on average than their better-qualified counterparts in the public sector. These results indicate that to improve medical services, at least for poor people, there should be greater emphasis on changing the incentives of public providers rather than increasing provider competence through training.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Das, Jishnu
Hammer, Jeffrey
author_facet Das, Jishnu
Hammer, Jeffrey
author_sort Das, Jishnu
title Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
title_short Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
title_full Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
title_fullStr Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
title_full_unstemmed Money for Nothing : The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India
title_sort money for nothing : the dire straits of medical practice in delhi, india
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6078943/money-nothing-dire-straits-medical-practice-delhi-india
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8196
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