“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” : Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys
Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8788860/heard-melodies-sweet-unheard-sweeter-understanding-corruption-using-cross-national-firm-level-surveys http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7653 |
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okr-10986-76532021-04-23T14:02:34Z “Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” : Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys Jensen, Nathan M. Li, Quan Rahman, Aminur ADVISORY SERVICES ANTICORRUPTION BIASES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENSORSHIP CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS CIVIL LIBERTIES COLLABORATION COMPETITORS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC REFORM EMBEZZLEMENT EXCLUSION EXPENDITURE FEAR OF REPRISALS FIRMS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FREE PRESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVIEWS INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LEARNING NEPOTISM PRIVATE ENTERPRISE PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE GAINS PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION REPRESSION SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms' responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data generation of nonresponse and false response is a function of the political environment in which the firms operate. In a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in firms' responses could result in underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies in the available truthful responses in firm surveys. 2012-06-11T15:33:47Z 2012-06-11T15:33:47Z 2007-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8788860/heard-melodies-sweet-unheard-sweeter-understanding-corruption-using-cross-national-firm-level-surveys http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7653 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4413 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ADVISORY SERVICES ANTICORRUPTION BIASES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENSORSHIP CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS CIVIL LIBERTIES COLLABORATION COMPETITORS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC REFORM EMBEZZLEMENT EXCLUSION EXPENDITURE FEAR OF REPRISALS FIRMS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FREE PRESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVIEWS INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LEARNING NEPOTISM PRIVATE ENTERPRISE PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE GAINS PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION REPRESSION SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY |
| spellingShingle |
ADVISORY SERVICES ANTICORRUPTION BIASES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENSORSHIP CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS CIVIL LIBERTIES COLLABORATION COMPETITORS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC REFORM EMBEZZLEMENT EXCLUSION EXPENDITURE FEAR OF REPRISALS FIRMS FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTMENT FREE PRESS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERVIEWS INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LEARNING NEPOTISM PRIVATE ENTERPRISE PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE GAINS PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION REPRESSION SMALL FIRM SMALL FIRMS SOURCE OF INFORMATION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY Jensen, Nathan M. Li, Quan Rahman, Aminur “Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” : Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4413 |
| description |
Since the early 1990s, a large number of
studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and
consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have
employed firm-level survey data from various countries.
While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys
have largely ignored two important potential problems:
nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating
firms' responses on a sensitive issue like corruption
at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and
erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data
generation of nonresponse and false response is a function
of the political environment in which the firms operate. In
a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse
and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption
is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the
World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms
in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms
in countries with less press freedom are more likely to
provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of
corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in
firms' responses could result in underestimation of the
severity of corruption in politically repressive countries.
More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source
of information on the political constraints faced by the
firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard
melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies
in the available truthful responses in firm surveys. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Jensen, Nathan M. Li, Quan Rahman, Aminur |
| author_facet |
Jensen, Nathan M. Li, Quan Rahman, Aminur |
| author_sort |
Jensen, Nathan M. |
| title |
“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” :
Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| title_short |
“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” :
Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| title_full |
“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” :
Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| title_fullStr |
“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” :
Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| title_full_unstemmed |
“Heard Melodies Are Sweet, but Those Unheard Are Sweeter” :
Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys |
| title_sort |
“heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter” :
understanding corruption using cross-national firm-level surveys |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8788860/heard-melodies-sweet-unheard-sweeter-understanding-corruption-using-cross-national-firm-level-surveys http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7653 |
| _version_ |
1764402647236870144 |