The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms
This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience wi...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529 |
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okr-10986-75292021-04-23T14:02:34Z The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms González, Alvaro Ernesto López-Córdova, J. E. Valladares, Elio ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARSON BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENTRY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BUSINESSES CENTRAL AMERICA CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS ENTREPRENEURS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT HOUSEHOLDS INSPECTIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSES MEDIA MOBILE TELEPHONES MULTINATIONAL NEPOTISM PAYOFF PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY RESULT RESULTS ROBBERY SOLICITATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE TELEPHONE CONNECTION TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION USERS VICTIMS WEB Microdata Set This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America. 2012-06-08T15:39:03Z 2012-06-08T15:39:03Z 2007-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4394 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARSON BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENTRY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BUSINESSES CENTRAL AMERICA CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS ENTREPRENEURS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT HOUSEHOLDS INSPECTIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSES MEDIA MOBILE TELEPHONES MULTINATIONAL NEPOTISM PAYOFF PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY RESULT RESULTS ROBBERY SOLICITATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE TELEPHONE CONNECTION TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION USERS VICTIMS WEB Microdata Set |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARSON BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENTRY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS REGULATIONS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BUSINESSES CENTRAL AMERICA CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CRIME DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS ENTREPRENEURS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAFT HOUSEHOLDS INSPECTIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSES MEDIA MOBILE TELEPHONES MULTINATIONAL NEPOTISM PAYOFF PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY RESULT RESULTS ROBBERY SOLICITATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE TELEPHONE CONNECTION TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION USERS VICTIMS WEB Microdata Set González, Alvaro Ernesto López-Córdova, J. E. Valladares, Elio The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4394 |
| description |
This paper measures the extent to which
firms in developing countries are the target of bribes.
Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin
American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust
slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and
hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of
graft. We then construct an experience-based index that
reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a
bribe in order to complete a specified set of business
transactions. On average, African firms are three times as
likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America,
although there is substantial variation within each region.
Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in
countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is
weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence
of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if
countries in the region had levels of democracy and
regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
González, Alvaro Ernesto López-Córdova, J. E. Valladares, Elio |
| author_facet |
González, Alvaro Ernesto López-Córdova, J. E. Valladares, Elio |
| author_sort |
González, Alvaro |
| title |
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| title_short |
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| title_full |
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| title_fullStr |
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms |
| title_sort |
incidence of graft on developing-country firms |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/11/8682858/incidence-graft-developing-country-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7529 |
| _version_ |
1764402465491386368 |